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TOBACCO ADVERTISEMENTS AND COMMERCIAL




The 1996 presidential election earmarked what may be the to-
bacco companies' toughest political and legal challenge to date. On
August 23, 1996, President Bill Clinton announced as part of his cam-
paign that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has broad juris-
diction to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco because nicotine
is an addictive drug.' Following a year-long drafting process, the FDA
published a final rule on August 28, 1996 which restricts the sale and
distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products.2 The rule3
establishes eighteen as the national legal smoking age; bans vending
machines and self-service displays in most locations; bans brand spon-
sorship of events; eliminates the sale and promotion of nontobacco
merchandise; prohibits billboard advertising near schools; and re-
stricts certain print media to a black-and-white, text-only format 4
Advertising regulations are not new to tobacco companies. To-
bacco advertisements have been subject to an increasing number of
federal regulations for the past thirty years. In 1965, following the
first Surgeon General's Report on smoking, Congress enacted legisla-
1 See Sheryl Stolberg, Clinton Imposes Wide Crackdown on Tobacco Finns, L.A. TImEs, Aug.
24, 1996, at Al. See also President Bill Clinton, Remarks by the President During the An-
nouncement of Food and Drug Administration Rule on Children and Tobacco, Address at
the Rose Garden, White House (August 23, 1996) [hereinafter Clinton 1996 Press Confer-
ence] (transcript available from Federal News Service).
2 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 801 et seq.) [hereinafter FDA Rule].
3 The bulk of the FDA Rule will become effective on August 28, 1997. See id. Addi-
tional requirements for tobacco retailers will become effective on February 28, 1997. See id.
And, prohibitions on the sale or distribution of brand-identified promotional nontobacco
items and on the sponsorship of events using a tobacco product brand-name will become
effective on February 28, 1998. See id.
4 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396. As mentioned above, this regulatory scheme
was finalized more than a year after the FDA drafted an initial proposal. See Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
§§ 801, 803, 804, and 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed FDA Rule].
Public comment on the initial proposal set a record for federal rulemaking with over
700,000 pieces of mall. See Stolberg, supra note 1, at Al.
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ion requiring that cigarette packages carry a printed warning.5
Shortly thereafter, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
required broadcasters to air antismoking commercials in conjunction
with cigarette advertisements. 6 And, in 1969, Congress banned televi-
sion and radio advertisements for cigarettes.7 Yet, tobacco companies
continue to market cigarettes through the print media as well as
through promotional activities.8 In response to the continued to-
bacco presence, President Clinton urged the FDA to take stronger ac-
tion against the advertising, promotion, distribution, and marketing
of cigarettes to teenagers.9 In support of the FDA rule, President Clin-
ton stated:
Children are bombarded daily by massive marketing campaigns that
play on their vulnerabilities, their insecurities, their longings to be
something in the world. Joe Camel promises that smoking will
make you cool. Virginia Slims models whisper that smoking will
help you stay thin. T-shirts and sports sponsorships sends [sic] the
message that healthy and vigorous people smoke and that smoking
5 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat.
282, 283 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1994)). Since the implementation
of the Act, Congress has increased the requirements for warning labels and mandated their
inclusion on all cigarette advertisements. See The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2000, 2201-02 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1994)).
6 See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (upholding antismoking adver-
tisements as part of the fairness doctrine), cet. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Under the
fairness doctrine, the FCC required radio and television broadcasters to provide a balanced
representation and fair coverage of controversial issues of public importance. See Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
7 See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat.
87, 89 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994)). See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitch-
ell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972).
8 Statistics indicate that cigarettes are one of the most heavily advertised products in
America. For example, in 1986, cigarette advertising and promotional expenditures to-
taled $2.3 billion. See Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy and Advertising, 77 IowA L. REv.
909, 913 (1992). Law notes that in 1986, cigarette advertisements provided one percent of
the advertising revenues of American newspapers and 8.4% of the advertising revenues of
American magazines. See id. (percentages taken from Ronald M. Davis, Current Trends in
Cigarette Advertising and Marketing, 316 NEw ENG.J. MED. 725, 726 (1987)). In 1994, adver-
thing and promotion expenditures increased to $4.6 billion. See Erica Swecker, Note, Joe
CameL Will "OldJoe" Survive?, 36 WM. & MARw L. REv. 1519, 1521 (1995) (statistic taken
from Teens Drawn In by Cigarette Ads, Study Find CHI. TaRB., Aug. 19,1994, § 1, at 5). Other
reports indicate that the tobacco industry spends an estimated $6 billion for advertise-
ments and promotions. See David Helberg, Note, Butt Out: An Analysis of theFDA 's Proposed
Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 Loy. LA L. REv.
1219, 1224 (1996) (figure taken from Federal Trade Commission, Report to Congress for
1993 Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 4 tbl.3, 18 tbl.3D
(1995)).
9 See Clinton 1996 Press Conference, supra note 1; see also President Bill Clinton,
Press Conference on Tobacco Related to Teenagers, Address at the East Room, White
House (August 10, 1995) [hereinafter Clinton 1995 Press Conference] (transcript available
in Federal News Service).
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is fun.... With this historic action that we are taking today, Joe
Camel and the Marlboro Man will be out of our children's reach
forever.' 0
The regulation's opponents fear that the FDA rule extends be-
yond the legitimate concern of protecting minors. Steve Parrish, Se-
nior Vice President of Philip Morris, summarized the tobacco
companies' opposition:
Our opposition to the FDA's rule rests not with its stated goal of
reducing underage tobacco use but with the FDA's specious and
arbitrary interpretation of federal law. The rule opens a Pandora's
box of regulation that tramples the Constitution and the rights of
millions of adult Americans. We will stand by those adults who
choose to smoke."
Therefore, opponents maintain that the FDA rule unlawfully restricts
truthful advertising to adult consumers.
For the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has accorded com-
mercial speech' 2 some level of First Amendment protection.' s In
1980, the Court developed a four-part balancing test for commercial
speech regulations in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission.'4 Under the four-prong analysis, the Court stated:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmen-
tal interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.15
However, because courts have applied the Central Hudson commercial
speech analysis inconsistently, it remains unclear what kinds of adver-
10 Clinton 1996 Press Conference, supra note 1, at 3.
11 Philip Morris U.S.A. Responds to FDA Rule on Tobacco Regulation, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug.
23, 1996, at 16:21:00.
12 The Court has offered different definitions for commercial speech. For example,
the Court has defined commercial speech as speech which does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). The Court has also defined commercial speech
broadly as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
13 See Vrrginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-65 (extending First Amendment protection to
licensed pharmacists advertising the prices of prescription drugs).
14 447 U.S. at 566.
15 Id. The Court clarified in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475-81 (1989),
that the fourth prong of the balancing test only requires a reasonable fit between the
government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.
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ising regulations will survive constitutional scrutiny under the four-
prong balancing test-particularly when the regulations involve adver-
tisements of harmful products.
This Note focuses on the recent FDA initiative against tobacco
sales and advertisements targeting promotion of harmful products.
This Note argues that lower courts have diluted the commercial
speech protection that the Supreme Court recognized over twenty
years ago.' 6 As a result, harmful products, such as tobacco and alco-
hol, have become easy targets under an essentially misapplied Central
Hudson balancing test. In other words, the slippery slope door is now
open wide to allow regulations against truthful, nonmisleading adver-
tisements of lawful products.17 Therefore, this Note concludes that
the Court should strengthen the Central Hudson balancing test to bet-
ter protect truthful, nonmisleading advertising of lawful products, and
it should only permit restrictions on advertising of harmful products
where such restrictions are narrowly tailored to protect children.
Part I of this Note describes the current regulatory movements to
restrict tobacco advertisements and the problems they might raise
under the First Amendment'18 This Part will focus on the FDA's final
rule,' 9 exemplifying broad advertising restrictions of commercial
speech which warrant First Amendment scrutiny. This Part will also
discuss other federal, state, and municipal regulations.
Part II analyzes how the proposed FDA rule would fare under
First Amendment scrutiny.2 0 The first section traces the development
of the commercial speech doctrine and discusses various tests the
Court has applied to advertising regulations. The second section ex-
amines the advertising restrictions under the modem commercial
speech doctrine. The final section discusses the problems with the
16 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
17 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]he test now
evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent with our prior cases and does not pro-
vide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech.").
18 Besides the First Amendment question, there have also been recent constitutional
challenges to the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate cigarette advertisements. For example, in
the U.S. District Court of North Carolina, at least two cases were filed challenging the
FDA's jurisdiction. See American Advertising Fed'n v. Kessler, No. 2:95CV00593 (D. N.C.
filed Sept. 27, 1995); Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., No.
2:95CV00591 (D. N.C. filed Sept. 27, 1995). Thejurisdiction issue is beyond the scope of
this Note.
19 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396.
20 Similar to this Note, Helberg's Note, supra note 8, at 1250-71, analyzes the FDA rule
and concludes that the regulation violates the First Amendment because it is more exten-
sive than necessary to accomplish the government objective of preventing smoking by mi-
nors. This Note is broader in scope because it analyzes the final rule and explores the
theoretical and practical implications for truthful, nonmisleading advertising of legal prod-
ucts. Moreover, this Note suggests regulations that the FDA could pass which would sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny and protect minors from the dangers of smoking.
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current test's protection of truthful advertisements. This Part analyzes
the theories advanced under First Amendmentjurisprudence and sug-
gests other theories that justify broader protection for commercial
speech. In addition, this Part will explain how the inconsistent degree
of scrutiny given regulations under the Central Hudson test weakens
the very protection the Court tried to provide to advertisers and con-
suners.2 1 Therefore, this Part concludes that, under modem com-
mercial speech analysis, the FDA rule violates commercial speech
protections, but that the Court might nevertheless uphold overbroad
restrictions on truthful advertisements of tobacco products. As a re-
sult, the theories and rationales which limit advertisements spread a
growing cancer that endangers First Amendment values.
Part III recommends an approach that would strengthen the
commercial speech test of the First Amendment, while still permitting
some regulations on advertising that targets the young. Since the re-
cent advertising restrictions strive to protect minors from harmful
products, the regulations should be narrowly tailored to meet that ob-
jective. This Note concludes that courts can embrace a paternalistic
attitude to protect children and yet endorse an unfettered flow of in-
formation for the adult consumer audience.
I
THE ANTISMOIuNG INITIATIVE: PROTECTING THE YOUNG
Few would dispute that smoking creates health hazards. Tobacco
products are responsible for more than 400,000 deaths each year from
cancer, respiratory illness, heart disease, and other ailments. 22 Smok-
ers who die from such health problems lose an average of twelve to
fifteen years of life.2 3 Despite the documented risks associated with
cigarette smoking, the FDA reports that fifty million Americans cur-
rently smoke cigarettes and another six million use smokeless tobacco
products. 24 A Surgeon General's Report indicates that more than
three million American adolescents sm6ke cigarettes and more than
21 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976). Justice Blackmun stated, "What is at issue is whether a State may completely
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activ-
ity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients." Id.
22 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,898 (citing information from U.S. DEP'T OF
HETH & HumAN SEavs. (DHHS), Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Po-
tential Life Lost-United States, 1990, 42 MoaiDrBr & MoRTA=LrY WKLx. REP. 645, 645-49
(1993)).
23 See Proposed FDA Rule, supra note 4, at 41,814 (citing information from DHHS,
Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-United States, 1990,
supra note 22, at 645-49).
24 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,398.
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one million adolescent males use smokeless tobacco.25 According to
the FDA, three thousand young people become addicted to nicotine
every day, and smoking rates continue to rise among young people.26
In response to these alarming numbers, the government adopted
measures to protect children and adolescents. On August 10, 1995,
President Clinton first authorized the FDA to initiate broad action,
stating:
When Joe Camel tells young children that smoking is cool, when
billboards tell teens that smoking will lead to true romance, when
Virginia Slims tells adolescents that cigarettes may make them thin
and glamorous, then our children need our wisdom, our guidance
and our experience. We're their parents, and it's up to us to protect
them.27
The FDA rule targets young people in an attempt to reduce the over-
all use of tobacco. Data suggests that most people who smoke start
during adolescence. 28 Thus, the FDA hopes its rule will reduce-by at
least half-the use of tobacco products by children and adolescents
and, consequently, will reduce the number of overall smokers in the
future.29
In order to protect minors, the FDA placed restrictions on the
sale, distribution, and marketing of tobacco products.3 0 The FDA rule
establishes eighteen as the minimum age to purchase cigarettes and
requires retailers to verify that each purchaser is of legal age.31 The
rule prohibits free samples of tobacco products and bans the sale of
those products through vending machines and self-service displays ex-
25 See i&L (citing DHHS, PRasvrErnN ToBAcco UsE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1994) [hereinafter 1994 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]).
26 See FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,314, 41,315. The FDA reported:
Between 1991 and 1994, the prevalence of smoking by eighth graders in-
creased 80%, from 14.3% to 18.6%. Among tenth grade students, it in-
creased from 20.8% to 25.4% and for twelfth grade students, it rose from
28.3% to 31.2%. Between 1985 and 1994, smoking among college fresh-
men increased from nine percent to 12.5%.
Id. at 41,315.
27 Clinton 1995 Press Conference, supra note 9, at 1-2.
28 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,398-99; FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at
41,314 (citing 1994 SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 25, at 5, 58, 65-67).
29 See FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,314.
30 Interestingly, congressional indecision probably played a key role in initiating ad-
ministrative action. From 1987 to 1994, for example, Congress considered a variety of bills
which would have banned, among other things, tobacco advertising, sports sponsorships by
tobacco companies, the distribution of tobacco samples, marketing of nontobacco prod-
ucts under tobacco brand names, and tobacco advertising near schools. See, e.g., H.R.
3614, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 1493,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 1250, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 1532, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1987). These bills were not
enacted.
31 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399.
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cept in facilities where individuals under eighteen are not permitted
at any time.3 2 The speech restrictions limit advertising and labeling in
publications which have either a youth readership of fifteen percent
or more than two million readers under age eighteen to black-and-
white, text-only tombstone ads.3 3 Outdoor advertisements of tobacco
products cannot appear within one thousand feet of an elementary or
secondary school or playground. The FDA Rule also prohibits: the
sale or distribution of nontobacco items that are identified with to-
bacco brands; free "gifts" of nontobacco items in conjunction with the
purchase of tobacco products; contests and lotteries linked to the
purchase of tobacco products; and sponsorship of events under a to-
bacco brand name or identifying characteristic.3 5 Recently, Senator
Lautenberg proposed the Tobacco-Free Children's Internet Act of
1996 which would extend the FDA rule to advertisements of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco over the Internet or other computer services.3 6
In addition to federal initiatives, state and municipal regulations
also limit the advertisement of harmful products to minors.3 7 For ex-
32 See id.
33 See it. at 44,399, 44,513. Current advertisements include colorful graphics. The
FDA rule, however, requires that advertisements in publications with the requisite number
of readers under age 18 use only black text on a white background to reduce the appeal of
cigarette labeling and advertising to minors without affecting the informational message
conveyed to adults. See id. at 44,508; Proposed FDA Rule, supra note 4, at 41,335. This
requirement does not apply to adult-readership publications; therefore, these publications
will be allowed to use imagery and color because the effect of such advertising on young
people would be minimal. See Proposed FDA Rule, supra note 4, at 41,335.
34 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399, 44,502.
35 See id. at 44,399, 44,521-36. The final rule differs from the original rule in several
respects. First, the proposed rule would have completely prohibited the sale of cigarettes
in vending machines, but the final rule permits them in establishments, such as bars and
nightclubs, where children are not permitted. See id. at 44,427, 44,448-50. Second, while
the proposed rule would have banned mail-order sales, the final rule allows those sales
except for mall-order redemption of coupons and the distribution of free samples. See id.
at 44,427, 44,458-62. Third, the original plan banned tobacco companies from sponsoring
sporting events using their brand names, and the final rule extends that to sponsorship of
teams. See id at 44,527-36. Finally, the original plan called for a $150 million fund to
conduct a national campaign to educate minors about smoking, but the FDA eliminated
that provision and will require an education campaign through warnings to the consumers
of the harm caused by the product. See id. at 44,538-39.
36 142 CONG. REC. S12,126-02 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
37 The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCCAA), 15 U.S.C. § 1334
(1994), preempts state law with respect to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes when
the state's prohibition is based on smoking and health. See, e.g., Vango Media, Inc. v. City
of New York, 34 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the FCLAA preempts an ordinance
requiring city-licensed facilities to display one message addressing the dangers of smoking
for every four tobacco advertisements displayed); Chiglo v. City of Preston, 909 F. Supp.
675, 678 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that the FCLAA preempted Preston's ordinance
prohibiting all "point of sale" advertising in retail establishments and that the ordinance
impermissibly regulated the "content and appearance" of advertisements). State regula-
tions are not preempted if they merely restrict the location of cigarette advertisements.
The FCLAA also allows common law claims for breach of express warranty, misrepresenta-
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ample, the City Council of Baltimore passed ordinances that prohibit
cigarette and alcohol advertisements on any publicly visible sign ex-
cept for advertisements in purely commercial areas.38 A similar law
regulating the location of tobacco, advertisements was enacted in Cin-
cinnati, Ohio.3 9
Additional federal government actions are also aimed directly at
reducing adolescent smoking. For example, the Department of
Health and Human Services issued a rule requiring that states (1) pro-
hibit the sale or distribution of tobacco products to individuals
younger than eighteen; and (2) police such underage distribution
through annual reports and random, unannounced inspections.40
Only states in compliance with these requirements can qualify for a
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grant.4' Other fed-
eral government programs include The Pro-Children Act of 1994,42
which forbids smoking in any school or day care center receiving fed-
eral funds, and The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act
of 1994,43 which provides for tobacco education in the schools. Fi-
nally, numerous states have funded multimillion dollar projects to
prevent adolescent smoking.44
tion, intentional fraud, and conspiracy. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504 (1992) (finding that the FCLAA only preempted certain common law claims against
tobacco companies based on failure to warn and misrepresentation, but permitted state
recoveries based on other common law claims); Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
63 F.3d 1318, 1324 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the FCLAA does not preempt a municipal
ordinance banning cigarette billboards in certain areas of the city), vacated sub nom. Penn
Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575, affid on reh'g 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.
1996).
38 See Penn Advertising, 63 F.Sd at 1321, 1324 (upholding the constitutionality of Balti-
more City Code, Art. 30 (zoning), § 10.0-1(I) which prohibits cigarette advertisements on
publicly visible signs); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1308-09 (4th Cir.
1995) (upholding the constitutionality of Baltimore City code, Art. 30 (zoning), § 10.0-
1(H) which prohibits alcohol advertisements on publicly visible signs), vacated 116 S. Ct.
1821, aff'd on rehg, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996).
39 See Tobacco: Companies Face Setbacks in Two Court Fights, AM. HEALTH LINE, Sept. 5,
1995, at 10.
40 See Tobacco Regulation for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block
Grants, 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 96). In its final rule, the
DHHS Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration stated that, "while this
final rule is directed to the States and the FDA proposal focuses on the tobacco industry
and retailers, they are both designed to help address the serious public health problem
caused by young people's use of and addiction to nicotine-containing tobacco products."
Id. at 1492.
41 See id.
42 20 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6084 (1994).
43 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7143 (1994).
44 Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Coyne Beahm, Inc. v.
United States Food and Drug Admin., No. 2:95CV00591 (D. N.C. filed Sept. 27, 1995).
The complaint indicates that, as an example, the Massachusetts Department of Health ini-
tiated a $58 million program designed to prevent underage smoking.
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These federal, state, and local actions demonstrate a common
and sincere effort to target smoking by minors. Free speech advo-
cates, however, worry that some of the regulations extend beyond le-
gitimate governmental regulation and impermissibly stifle commercial
speech. The recent FDA initiative combines nonspeech regulations
such as establishing a federal legal age to purchase cigarettes with
speech restrictions such as limiting advertisements in publications and
on billboards. 45 A pending lawsuit challenging the FDA rule claims
that the regulations cannot meet the Supreme Court standards for
commercial speech because they "do not directly advance the FDA's
stated objective of reducing underage use of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products, and they are not narrowly tailored to reasonably fit
that objective."46 In response to the portion of the FDA rule that re-
quires black-and-white, text-only advertisements, Magazine Publishers
of America Vice President George Gross-a party to the lawsuit-criti-
cized the regulation as not narrowly tailored, explaining that restrict-
ing tobacco advertisements in publications with fifteen percent youth
readership means that eighty-five percent of adult readers will not re-
ceive the tobacco companies' full message.47 The ban on tobacco ad-
vertisements near schools, the lawsuit states, "is an unconstitutional de
facto ban on tobacco advertisements in most urban areas."48
This lawsuit demonstrates the constitutional tension between the
government's substantial interest in protecting minors from addiction
to tobacco products and advertisers' free speech right to provide in-
formation about their products to consumers. The FDA rule repre-
sents a growing trend of regulations that attempt to combat the
significant problem of nicotine addiction among the country's adoles-
cents. 49 The next section will explore the extent to which commercial
speech balancing will protect tobacco advertisements and the implica-
45 See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
46 Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at
15, American Advertising Fed'n v. Kessler, No. 2:95CV00593 (D. N.C. filed Sept. 27, 1995)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs Amended Complaint]. The complaint refers to the third and
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson balancing test. See supra text accompanying note 15;
infra Part HA (discussing the Court's treatment of the Central Hudson balancing test).
47 Debra G. Hernandez, Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug.
19, 1995, at 12. The magazines that would be restricted to black and white, text-only adver-
tisements include: Sports Illustrated, People, TV Guide, Parade, Cosmopolitan, Entertainment
Weekly, Better Homes & Gardens, Glamour, Rolling Stone, Car & Driver, Lif Outdoor Life, Road
& Track, Mademoiselle, Vogue, Hot Rod, Ebony, Gentleman's Quarterly, Motor Trend, Premiere,
Sport, E11e Essence, Jet, Popular Science, Self, Harper's Bazaar, The Sporting News, Cable Guide, and
Ski. See Mike Brown, Muzzling Tobacco Ads Pits FDA Against Constitution, CouRiER-J., Sept. 8,
1996, at 1A.
48 Hernandez, supra note 47, at 12; see Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 46,
at 8.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
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tions for other truthful, nonmisleading advertisements of lawful
products.
II
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DoCTRIN AND WEAK
PROTECTION
An in-depth, historical review of the Supreme Court's treatment
of commercial speech aids in understanding how the regulation of
tobacco advertising might fare under First Amendment scrutiny. The
Court has struggled to define the proper constitutional protection
that should be accorded advertisements and the proper amount of
deference that should be accorded legislatures when courts evaluate
commercial speech regulations.50 In so doing, the Court has created
inconsistencies in the theory and application of the Central Hudson
balancing test.51 As a result, advertisers are left wondering which reg-
ulations will survive First Amendment scrutiny.
A. The History of Commercial Speech: A Bumpy Road to
Constitutional Protection
Commercial advertising initially received no protection under the
First Amendment. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,52 the Court held that,
although speech cannot be unduly burdened, the Constitution im-
poses no such restraint on regulations for commercial advertise-
ments.53 The Court accorded the legislature broad deference in
proscribing commercial speech to protect the public interest.54 As a
result of commercial speech's unprotected status, numerous regula-
tions restricted commercial advertisements. 55
The Court finally granted commercial speech First Amendment
protection in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
50 See discussion infra Part HA.
51 See discussion infra Part ll.C.
52 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
53 See id. at 54 (upholding a conviction under a New York ordinance that limited the
right to distribute advertising handbills in public places).
54 See id.
55 See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951) (upholding a municipal
ordinance which prohibited door-to-door solicitation by vendors or merchants). In Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass, the Court cited other regulations that permissibly limited communi-
cations. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (the exchange of securities information); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970) (the publication of corporate proxy statements); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (the exchange of price and production
information among competitors). Another particularly relevant example is the federal ban
of tobacco advertisements on television and radio. See Public Health Smoking Act of 1969,
15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
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sumer Council56 when it struck down a statute banning licensed phar-
macists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.57 The Court
established three important principles for commercial speech. First,
the Court affirmed the proposition that the economic motivation be-
hind commercial speech does not eliminate First Amendment protec-
tion.58 Second, the Court found that the First Amendment offers
protection for the dissemination of information and ideas to consum-
ers.59 The Court, therefore, recognized that the First Amendment
protects the interests of both the speaker and the audience.60 Finally,
the First Amendment protects commercial speech from paternalistic
regulations.61 Raising the banner against paternalism, the Court
argued:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic ap-
proach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in
itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
56 425 U.S. 748 (1976). After Chrestensen, the Court retreated from the position that
the government had unlimited regulatory power over commercial speech. See New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that First Amendment protection applies
to opinions on public issues even when printed in advertisements, thus refusing to apply
the Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine to a libel action against a newspaper for pub-
lishing a paid political advertisement). See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting newspa-
pers from listing employment advertisements based on gender, but suggesting that the
First Amendment might protect some advertisements for legal activity, but not for illegal
activity); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (striking down an ordinance which pro-
hibited the circulation of any publication that encouraged or promoted abortion because
the advertisements related to the public's constitutional interests). In Bigelow, the Court
left unresolved whether the First Amendment "permits regulation of advertising that is
related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit." Id. at 825.
57 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
58 Id. at 761. In an important footnote, the Court differentiated commercial speech
from other types of speech. See id. at 772 n.24. The Court stated that "[e]ven if the differ-
ences do notjustify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to
complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of pro-
tection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial informa-
tion is unimpaired." Id.
59 See id. at 763 ("[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of information,
... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate.").
60 See id. at 761-64. The audience's right to know has been recognized by the Court in
several noncommercial cases prior to Vrginia Pharmacy. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he Court's decisions involving corporations in the
business of communication or entertainment are based.., also on [the First Amend-
ment's] role in affording the public access to discussion, debate and the dissemination of
information and ideas."); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (recognizing the audi-
ence's right to preserve the uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will prevail,
rather than approving monopolization of that market by the government or a private
licensee).
61 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
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end is to open- the channels of communication rather than to close
them.... It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.62
The Court essentially breathed life into First Amendment protection
for commercial speech. Absent recognized restrictions on advertis-
ing,63 a state may not suppress the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion about entirely lawful activity due solely to fear that the
information will harm its disseminators and recipients.6
The Court, however, has afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection in recognition of its subordinate First Amend-
ment position.65 The Court failed to articulate precisely why commer-
cial speech receives limited protection, but rationalized its position by
stating, "We have not discarded the 'common-sense' distinction be-
tween speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other vari-
eties of speech."66 The Court then articulated the degree of protec-
tion commercial speech receives under its subordinate First
Amendment position. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission,67 the Court developed the prevailing four-step test
for evaluating commercial speech regulation. 68 The questions that
must be evaluated under this balancing test are: (1) whether the
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the
governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest; and (4) whether the regu-
lation is not more extensive than necessary. 69
The Ohralik and Central Hudson cases retreated from the anti-
paternalistic language Justice Blackmun used to protect the dissemi-
nation of truthful information. 70 As Professor Steven Shiffrin
62 Id.
63 See id. at 770-72 (stating that some commercial speech regulations are permissible,
such as time, place, and manner restrictions, regulations against false and misleading
speech, or laws banning advertisements that promote illegal activity).
64 See id. at 773.
65 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[W]e instead have
afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of FirstAmendment values, while allowing modes of regu-
lation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.").
66 Id. at 455-56. The Court also stated a concern that "[t]o require a parity of consti-
tutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution,
simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the
latter kind of speech." Id. at 456.
67 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
68 See id. at 566.
69 See id.
70 In Central Hudson, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's test as inconsistent
with prior caselaw. Blackmun argued that such a test "does not provide adequate protec-
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observed, "The Court has not explained why commercial speech de-
serves a subordinate place in a hierarchy of protected speech and why
it has shifted its stand on paternalism without extended consideration
of the implications of either position."'71 As a result, commercial
speech receives some First Amendment protection, but can be regu-
lated so long as it passes Central Hudson scrutiny.72
Under Central Hudson, however, the Court continued to loosen
the scrutiny with which it analyzed regulations against commercial
speech. For example, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,73 the
Court found that the city ordinance imposing prohibitions on bill-
boards directly advanced the city's substantial interest in preserving
the aesthetic beauty of the city and in protecting the public from traf-
fic hazards.7 4 Although the Court struck down the San Diego ordi-
nance,75 the case paved the way for deferential treatment of the
legislature's reasons for enforcing a regulation. 76 In Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,77 the Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute
banning the advertisement of casino gambling aimed at Puerto Rico
citizens. 78 In applying the Central Hudson test, the Court deferred to
the legislative determination that advertising for gambling would in-
crease the demand for the product, and that the restriction on adver-
tising was no more extensive than necessary to reduce the demand for
casino gambling.79 In addition, the Posadas majority rejected the Vir-
ginia Pharmacy principle that a state may not completely suppress the
dissemination of truthful information about entirely lawful activity.80
In dictum, the Court stated that "it is precisely because the govern-
ment could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying
conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intru-
sive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through
don for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech." Id. at 573 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
71 Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1223 (1984).
72 Shiffrin observed that "the test adopted by the Court in Central Hudson... makes it
clear that the Court will permit suppression of the truth if substantial state objectives are
furthered in the least restrictive way." Id. at 1260.
73 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
74 See id. at 507-08.
75 See id. at 512-17 (striking down the ordinance because it permitted on-site commer-
cial billboard advertising while prohibiting on-site noncommercial billboard advertising,
and further permitting exceptions to the ban on noncommercial messages so the city had
to allow billboards conveying other noncommercial messages).
76 See id. at 507-09 (finding that the legislature's reasoning was not manifestly unrea-
sonable on these facts).
77 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
78 See id. at 331.
79 See id. at 341-44.
80 See id. at 345-46.
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restrictions on advertising.""' Such a constitutional theory would
abolish almost all truthful advertising, since most economic and com-
mercial conduct could be banned by legislatures. The Court then fur-
ther weakened the Central Hudson test. In Board of Trustees v. Fox,8 2 the
Court interpreted the fourth prong of the test--"not more extensive
than necessary"-as requiring something less than a least-restrictive-
means standard. 3 The Court concluded that the fourth prong re-
quires only a reasonable fit between the government's ends and the
means narrowly tailored to accomplish those ends.8 4
Collectively, these cases have made it easier for federal and state
legislatures to regulate commercial speech. A regulation can suppress
truthful information about a lawful product as long as the substantial
government interest is directly advanced by a reasonable means nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.85 It remains unclear
under this line of cases whether the Court will interpret Central Hud-
son as calling for an intermediate standard of review or as calling for a
more deferential standard.
In recent years, the Court has attempted to rehabilitate First
Amendment protection for commercial speech. For example, in City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,8 6 the Court invalidated a ban on
distributing commercial handbills in newsracks because the city failed
"to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its legitimate interests in safety
and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition on
newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests."87 The Court
applied the Central Hudson balancing test with an intent to fortify the
First Amendment inquiry of commercial speech regulations.8 8 In con-
sidering other alternatives, the Court stated, "[W]hile we have re-
jected the 'least-restrictive-means' test for judging restrictions on
commercial speech,... if there are numerous and obvious less-bur-
densome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' be-
tween ends and means is reasonable."89 The Court refused to defer to
81 Id. at 346.
82 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
83 See id. at 477.
84 See id. at 480 ("Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to
judge what manner of regulation may best be employed.").
85 See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
86 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
87 Id. at 416-17 (finding that the city "failed to address its recently developed concern
about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number," which indicated
that the city did not carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the burden of
speech imposed by its prohibition). The Court determined that the safety and aesthetic
benefit was minimal since the ban would remove only 62 commercial newsracks from the
city's streets leaving 1500 to 2000 newsracks in place. See id. at 417-18.
88 See id. at 416.
89 Id. at 417 n.13.
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legislative findings in determining a reasonable fit for the govern-
ment's substantial interests.90
In Edenfield v. Fane,91 the Court struck down a prohibition against
solicitations by certified public accountants (CPAs) because the gov-
ernment could not justify such a restriction on "mere speculation or
conjecture." 92  The Court observed that the government "must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."93 Therefore, the state
failed to demonstrate that a reasonable fit existed between the ban on
CPA in-house solicitation and the government's interests in prevent-
ing fraud, ensuring privacy, and maintaining CPA independence. 94
Discovery Network and Edenfield placed the burden on the govern-
ment to prove that the regulation advanced a substantial interest. In
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,95 however, the Court returned to
the deferential standard elaborated in Posadas.9 6 The Edge Court up-
held a federal ban restricting broadcasters licensed in nonlottery
states from advertising other states' lotteries, finding that "Congress
clearly was entitled to determine that broadcast of promotional adver-
tising of lotteries undermines... [a] policy against gambling, even if
the ... audience is not wholly unaware of the lottery's existence."97
The Court concluded:
If there is an immediate connection between advertising and de-
mand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to
reason that the policy of decreasing demand for gambling is corre-
spondingly advanced. Accordingly, the Government may be said to
90 See id. at 428 (holding that Cincinnati failed to justify its differential treatment of
commercial and noncommercial newsracks).
91 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
92 Id. at 770-71.
93 Id. at 771. The Court held that, unlike a ban on attorney solicitation, where the
potential for fraud and overreaching is great, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 465-66 (1978), solicitation by CPAs does not pose substantial harms. See Edenfied 507
U.S. at 775.
94 Edenfied, 507 U.S. at 770-73.
95 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
96 See id. at 434; see also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328,
341-44 (1986).
97 Edge, 509 U.S. at 434. There may be a connection between the changing standard
and the medium for the advertising. Broadcast media, such as television and radio, are
more regulated than print media due to the limited number of available broadcast licenses
and the concept of public ownership of the airwaves. Compare Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornifo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (recognizing the editorial autonomy of newspa-
pers in deciding what material to print) with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (upholding the right to impose broadcast requirements on radio licensees because
of the scarcity of radio frequencies and, consequently, the government's power to place
restraints on licensees to permit the public to retain rights in the medium).
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advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery advertising,
even where it is not wholly eradicated.98
The Edge Court's decision to follow the Posadas precedent 99 may
have been motivated by one of two reasons: a desire to adhere to a
deferential standard of review in regulating broadcast licensees 00 or a
desire to apply a deferential standard of review to commercial speech
restrictions on advertisements which promote harmful products or ac-
tivities. Regardless, the Court certainly moved away from the position
that a state could never suppress advertisements of truthful informa-
tion through paternalistic regulations.
The Edge Court did not address the Government's argument that
because gambling is an activity often characterized as a vice, the
greater power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban its advertisement.101 In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,' 0 2 the
Court removed any doubt as to whether the Central Hudson standard
applied to regulations which limit speech that promotes socially harm-
ful activities. 103 The Court flatly rejected the argument that legisla-
tures have broader latitude to regulate speech that promotes socially
harmful activities than other types of speech.104
The Court has clearly upheld the Central Hudson test, but it has
applied the test with varying degrees of scrutiny. Generally, the Court
analyzes the commercial speech regulations under intermediate scru-
tiny, placing the burden on the government to prove that its chosen
means directly advance a substantial government interest. 105 How-
ever, when the Court faces advertising regulations of harmful prod-
ucts, the Court has deferred to legislative findings in order to uphold
the regulation. 10 6
98 Edge, 509 U.S. at 434.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
100 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101 Edge, 509 U.S. at 425 (refusing to address this issue because the Court of Appeals
did not discuss the argument, and holding that the statute is constitutional under the stan-
dards of Central Hudson as applied by the courts below); see also Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (using this argument as a secondary
basis to uphold the Puerto Rico regulation banning gambling advertisement).
102 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594 (1995) (striking down a federal regulation prohibiting beer
labels from displaying alcohol content because the restriction failed to further the govern-
ment's interest in suppressing strength wars in a direct and material fashion, and because
the regulation was more extensive than necessary, since available alternatives to the label-
ing ban would be less intrusive).
103 Id. at 1589-90 n.2 ("Neither Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft an
exception to the Central Hudson standard, for in both of those cases we applied the Central
Hudson analysis.").
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., id. at 1592; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416
(1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993) (deferring to
the legislature's belief that banning lottery advertisements in a nonlottery state would dis-
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The Court's recent commercial speech cases require a rigorous
review of how the advertising restriction advances its governmental in-
terest. In Coors, the Court required the Government to show that
prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol content would curb
alcohol strength wars.'0 7 Recently in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
/and,10E the Court struck down a statutory ban on price advertising for
alcoholic beverages. 10 9 The Court, even though split among several
opinions, required the State to carry the burden and to show that a
"price advertising ban will significantly advance the State's interest in
promoting temperance."1 0 The Court chose not to defer to legisla-
tive findings but to require "findings of fact" and "evidentiary
support."l
The Coors and Liquormart cases involved regulations which
broadly restricted purely informational ad content 1 2 Even with the
Court's independent evaluation of commercial speech regulations,
however, the applicability of Central Hudson to regulations limiting ad-
vertisements of socially harmful or undesirable activities still remains
uncertain. 113 After Liquormart, the Court vacated the judgments in
the Baltimore outdoor-tobacco-advertising regulation cases-Penn Ad-
vertising and Anheuser-Busch-and remanded the cases to the Fourth
Circuit for further consideration." 4 The Fourth Circuit affirmed its
decisions notwithstanding Liquormars call for an independent evalua-
courage citizens from public participation in lotteries); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (deferring to Puerto Rico's decision to protect its
citizens from casino gambling advertisements despite possible alternatives).
107 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1585. The Court struck down the statute because of the
overall irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme. See id. at 1592-93.
108 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996).
109 See id. at 1501.
110 Id. at 1509 (Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, .Z., joining in this part of the
opinion).
Ill Id. at 1509-11. Justice O'Connor stated that in recent cases "we declined to accept
at face value the proffered justification for the statute's regulation, but examined carefully
the relationship between the asserted goals and the speech restriction used to reach that
goal." Id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
112 In other commercial speech regulations against advertisements of harmful prod-
ucts, the restrictions aim at broader marketing and promotion techniques that allegedly
increase consumption. See, e.g., FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,466-68 (discussing the effects
on minors of image advertising in magazines and on billboards).
113 The Supreme Court itself has retreated to a deferential application of Central Hud-
son. In F/orida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Court upheld a rule prohibiting attorneys from
soliciting personal injury victims for 30 days following the occurrence of the injury. See 115
S. Ct. 2871 (1995). Just two months after oorsJustice O'Connor relied on a scant two-year
study to prove sufficiently that the State's regulation directly advanced its interests. See id.
at 2378. In a deferential tone, Justice O'Connor stated, "[W]e have permitted litigants to
justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different
locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based
solely on history, consensus, and 'simple common sense.'" See id. (citations omitted).
114 Penn Adver., Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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tion.1 5 The Fourth Circuit stated that "[a]fter our own independent
assessment, we recognized the reasonableness of Baltimore City's leg-
islative finding that there is a 'definite correlation between alcoholic
beverage advertising and underage drinking."'116 Therefore, courts
still might permit restrictions with more rational schemes or less dras-
tic measures to restrict commercial messages.
Moreover, the Liquormart decision added more confusion to the
commercial speech doctrine. Even though the Court struck down the
advertising ban, the reasoning varied by justice." 7 One plurality cre-
ated two tests under the Central Hudson analysis to overturn a total ban
against truthful price advertising of alcoholic beverages." 8 Four
other Justices agreed that the ban on alcohol advertising violated the
First Amendment by applying the established Central Hudson test
rather than adopting a new analysis." 9 If one lesson from these cases
is clear, it is that the Court needs to reconcile the inconsistent treat-
ment of commercial speech regulation.
The next section will analyze the FDA rule under the current-
and inconsistent-commercial speech doctrine.
B. Regulations Against Tobacco Advertisements Might Survive
First Amendment Scrutiny
Tobacco advertisements present the next challenge for the courts
in the area of commercial speech. Regulations prohibiting tobacco
advertisements may vary from a total ban to a few minor restrictions
aimed at curtailing promotion of the harmful product' 2 0 For exam-
115 See Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996).
116 Anheuser-Busch, 101 F.3d at 327 (citation omitted).
117 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1501 (1996).
118 See iU at 1507. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg determined that regula-
tions which protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or
which require the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, should receive less than
strict review. See id. However, regulations that entirely prohibit the dissemination of truth-
ful, noncommercial messages should receive the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands with "special care, mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely
survive constitutional review." Id. at 1507-08. If this analysis garners a majority, a partial
ban like the FDA rule against tobacco advertising might pass the less than strict scrutiny
discussed by the plurality.
119 See id. at 1520-23 (O'Connor, Souter, Breyerj., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Thomas concluded that regulations aimed at keeping legal users of
a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace are
per se illegitimate, and the Central Hudson balancing test does not apply. See id. at 1515-16
(ThomasJ., concurring). AlthoughJustice Scalia adhered to the Court's existingjurispru-
dence, he concluded that the Court must look to the long accepted practices of the Ameri-
can people where suppression of political ideas is not at issue. See id. at 1515 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
120 In Posadas, Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority that "legislative regulation of
products or activities deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prosti-
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ple, the proposed FDA rule completely bans tobacco advertisements
on billboards near schools, and it restricts the lay-out of advertise-
ments in magazines with youth readership of fifteen percent to a
black-and-white, text-only format. 21 Each regulation against truthful,
nonmisleading tobacco advertisements would have to pass the Central
Hudson balancing test.' 22
Some Supreme Court opinions, however, maintain that such reg-
ulations should survive any First Amendment commercial speech scru-
tiny. For example, when commercial speech was initially accorded
First Amendment protection, Justice Rehnquist disapproved, re-
minding the Court that "the way will be open not only for dissemina-
tion of price information but for active promotion of prescription
drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and other products the use of which it has
previously been thought desirable to discourage." 123 In United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co.,124 the Court upheld a lottery advertisement re-
striction even though the regulation did not shield residents from all
information about lotteries. The Court analogized that, "Congress
has, for example, altogether banned the broadcast advertising of ciga-
rettes, even though it could hardly have believed that this regulation
would keep the public wholly ignorant of the availability of
cigarettes." 12
Some commentators have similarly supported the constitutional-
ity of regulations limiting advertisements of tobacco products. Profes-
sor Daniel Hay Lowenstein suggests a commercial speech theory that
only protects informational advertising useful to consumers. 126 Low-
enstein reasons:
[A] ny principle of freedom of commercial speech requiring the in-
validation of a ban on cigarette advertising would be unacceptable,
because it would impose on the country an extremely unreasona-
ble-perhaps outrageous-impediment to solving a public health
problem of overriding importance, with no noticeable gain in the
flow of useful information to consumers, which is what the commer-
cial speech doctrine has been designed to promote. 127
tution, has varied from outright prohibition on the one hand, to legalization of the prod-
uct or activity with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand." 478 U.S.
at 346 (citations omitted).
121 FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399, 44,502, 44,513.
122 See supra text accompanying note 15.
123 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
125 Id. at 434.
126 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CN. L. REv. 1205, 1208 (1988).
127 Id. at 1248.
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One author advocates abandoning the modem commercial
speech doctrine in favor of removing commercial speech from First
Amendment protection altogether, thus requiring courts to review to-
bacco regulations under a rational basis standard. 28 The author ar-
gues that, "[c]ombining the physical consequences of smoking with
the fact that regulating cigarette advertising is indistinguishable from
regulating the underlying transactions makes cigarette advertising
completely different from other forms of speech, either commercial
or noncommercial." 129 Professor Greg Marks argues in favor of keep-
ing a commercial speech balancing test and finds that "a state's inter-
est in the 'health, life, and safety' of its citizens is a more important
interest than a tobacco company's right to advertise cigarette's [sic] in
that state."8 0
Like these scholars, the FDA does not anticipate a First Amend-
ment problem with restricting tobacco advertisements-even in the
form of a total ban.'3 ' In its proposed rule, the FDA states, "While a
total ban on advertising, therefore, would likely be justified, FDA be-
lieves that limiting advertisements and labeling to which children are
exposed to a text-only format is less burdensome and would effectively
reduce the appeal of tobacco products to children and adoles-
cents."1 2 Bolstered by this reasoned outcry against tobacco advertise-
ments, the Court might uphold regulations, such as the FDA rule,
under the Central Hudson balancing test. 33
There is a greater urge to protect society from activities character-
ized as vices, for safety, health and moral reasons. 34 Therefore,
courts struggle to determine how substantial the government's inter-
est needs to be under Central Hudson, how directly the regulations
128 SeeJeffrey A. Berman, Note, Constitutional Realim: Legislative Bans on Tobacco Adver-
tisements and the First Amendment, 1986 U. ILL. L. Rv. 1193, 1194 (1986).
129 Id. at 1214. Berman also states that "[clommercial advertising serves economic
values that merit careful legislative consideration, and such interests are not proper sub-
jects for judicial review under the first amendment." Id. at 1215.
130 Paul J. Weber & Greg Marks, Debate on the Constitutionality and Desirability of a To-
bacco-Products AdvertisingBan, 15 N. Ky. L. Rr-v. 57, 57 (1988). As part of the state's interest
in protecting the health of its citizens, Marks states that "[cigarettes] kill large numbers of
people, debilitate an even greater number, and require the expenditure of billions of tax
dollars taking care of those with smoking-related diseases." Id. at 73.
131 See Proposed FDA Rule, supra note 4, at 41,336.
132 Id.
138 The Court has thoroughly rejected the argument that the Central Hudson analysis
does not apply to vices. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
134 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995) ("[T]he Government
here has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by
preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength, which could lead to
greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs."); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour-
ism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) ("We have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto
Rico Legislature's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a
'substantial' governmental interest.").
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must advance that interest, and how restrictive the regulations can be
to serve that interest. ss
This Note argues that the FDA rule fails First Amendment scru-
tiny when the Central Hudson test is properly applied. To receive any
First Amendment protection, tobacco advertisements must first con-
cern lawful activity and not be misleading. 36 Since anyone over eight-
een can purchase and smoke cigarettes, the speech does not concern
an unlawful activity.' 3 7 The speech cannot be labeled misleading.
Although the Federal Trade Commission presents a strong case that
advertisements for cigarettes deceptively associate smoking with attrac-
tive lifestyles, courts do not recognize these types of ads as inherently
misleading. 38
Once tobacco advertisements are shown to contain lawful and
truthful information, the government must demonstrate a substantial
interest in order to regulate them. 3 9 Courts have spoken clearly on
the issue that protecting the public health qualifies as a substantial
government interest. 14 In Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Balti-
more,' 41 the Fourth Circuit simply assumed a substantial government
interest in restricting outdoor tobacco advertisements.142 The court
stated, "In the context of the current public concern over the dangers
of cigarette consumption by minors, there can be little opposition to
the assertion that the City's objective in reducing cigarette consump-
135 These standards are part of the Central Hudson balancing test. See supra text accom-
panying note 15.
136 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
137 "Currently, all 50 states have laws prohibiting the sales of cigarettes to persons
under 18 years old." Mark R. Ludwikowski, Comment, Proposed Government Regulation of
Tobacco Advertising Uses Teens to Disguise First Amendment VWolations, 4 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS:
J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 105, 108 n.53 (Winter 1996) (statistic taken from Jacob Sullum, The
War on Tobacco; Smoking Regulations Go Way Too Far, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 20, 1995,
at G1). In addition, federal regulations recognize the legality of selling cigarettes to any-
one over 18 years of age. See Tobacco Regulation for Substance Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Block Grants, supra note 40, at 1492 (requiring states to prohibit selling or
distributing tobacco products to any individual under 18); FDA Rule, supra note 2, at
44,399 (establishing 18 as the minimum age of purchase).
138 See Berman, supra note 128, at 1207-08. Berman states, "Courts have held that the
Supreme Court's concern with misleading advertising is directed towards methods which
encourage fraud, overreaching, or confusion, not the technique of image creation present
in advertising most products." Id. at 1208. In the comparable situation of liquor advertise-
ments, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Nearly all advertising associates the promoted product with
a positive or alluring lifestyle or famous or beautiful people." Dunagin v. City of Oxford,
718 F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
139 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
140 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
141 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Penn Adver., Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S.
Ct. 2575, affd on reh'g, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
142 See id. at 1325.
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tion by minors constitutes a substantial public interest."14 The FDA
rules aim to protect children and adolescents from health problems
caused by the use of, and addiction to, tobacco products.144 There-
fore, the governmental interest satisfies the second prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test. 45
The tobacco advertising restrictions,' 46 however, fail the third
prong of the commercial speech balancing test whether the regula-
tion directly advances the asserted governmental interest. 147 Follow-
ing recent Supreme Court decisions, scrutiny under the third prong is
more rigorous and requires courts' independent evaluations of how
the regulation would advance the government's asserted purpose. 48
The FDA relied on many domestic and foreign studies in formulating
its final rule. 149 A proper application of the third prong would strike
down the FDA rule, however, because these studies establish a weak
connection between advertising and tobacco consumption by minors.
145 Id.
144 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,397-99.
145 Such a finding would be consistent with courts' treatment of the substantial govern-
ment interest regarding restrictions on advertising alcoholic beverages. See, e.g., Dunagin
v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (determining that alcohol
abuse harms society through disease, traffic accidents, and occupational and family
problems); Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 500 (10th Cir. 1983) (find-
ing that the State's interest in health, welfare, safety, productivity, and fhmily stability sup-
ports efforts to ban alcohol advertisements), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). For background commentary, see Krista L. Ed-
wards, Comment, First Amendment Values and the Constitutional Protection of Tobacco Advertis-
ing, 82 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 145, 168 n.136 (1987).
146 To review the FDA's commercial speech restrictions:
The rule also limits the advertising and labeling to which children and ado-
lescents are exposed. The rule accomplishes this by generally restricting
advertising to which children are exposed to a black-and-white, text-only
format. In addition, billboards and other outdoor advertising are prohib-
ited within one thousand feet of schools and public playgrounds. The rule
also prohibits the sale or distribution of brand-identified promotional,
nontobacco items such as hats and tee shirts. Furthermore, the rule pro-
hibits sponsorship of sporting and other events, teams, and entries in a
brand name of a tobacco product, but permits such sponsorship in a corpo-
rate name.
FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399.
147 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993) (stating
that it was the city's burden to establish a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate interests
and choice of a limited and elective prohibition as the means chosen to serve those inter-
ests); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) ("Here we require the govern-
ment goal to be substantial, and the cost to be carefully calculated. Moreover, since the
State bears the burden ofjustifying its restrictions, it must affirmatively reestablish the rea-
sonable fit we require.") (citations omitted).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
149 Proposed FDA Rule, supra note 4, at 41,315. The FDA examined many domestic
and foreign tobacco control statutes, regulations, and legislation, as well as numerous stud-
ies and reports. The FDA reviewed recommendations and reports from the World Health
Organization, the Office of the Surgeon General, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the National Cancer Institute, and the Institute of Medicine.
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Although the FDA maintains that a link exists between advertising and
smoking by minors,150 some experts have made contrary findings.' 51
For example, in 1989, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop stated,
"There is no scientifically rigorous study available to the public that
provides a definitive answer to the basic question of whether advertis-
ing and promotion increase the level of tobacco consumption.' 52 A
link between advertising and tobacco consumption by minors seems
less likely since teens account for less that three percent of total smok-
ers.153 In addition, studies have shown that teenagers are more influ-
enced by their peers and the presence of smokers in their lives.' 54
Without proof of a direct link between advertising and tobacco con-
150 Id. at 41,332-33. The FDA's findings assert that the 1994 Surgeon General's Report
concluded that "[a] substantial and growing body of scientific literature has reported on
young people's awareness of, and attitudes about, cigarette advertising and promotional
activities." Id. at 41,832. The 1994 Surgeon General's Report also found that
"[c]onsidered together, these studies offer a compelling argument for the mediated rela-
tionship of cigarette advertising and adolescent smoking." Id. (citing 1994 SURGEON GEN-
ERAL's REPORT, supra note 25, at 188).
151 For background commentary, see Lowenstein, supra note 126, at 1215 ("Numerous
econometric studies have yielded a variety of results, some showing a positive statistically
significant relationship between the incidence of smoking and the amount of advertising,
and other studies, especially those funded by the tobacco and advertising industries, show-
ing no such relationship.").
152 Ludwikowski, supra note 137, at 113 n.115 (quoting DHHS, REDUCrNG THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARs OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
516-17 (1989)). See also MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AmENDMENT 88-
89 (1989) (discussing a 1986 study by the International Advertising Association of growth
in per capita cigarette consumption in eight Communist-bloc countries in which tobacco
advertising was banned between 1970 and 1984). The IAA world study concluded:
There is no evidence from those countries where tobacco advertising has
been banned, that the ban has been accompanied by any significant reduc-
tion in overall consumption, per-capita consumption or the incidence of
smoking. The market trends apparent prior to the introduction of a ban
have largely continued unchanged in the years following it. On the other
hand, there is some evidence that the absence of advertising can signifi-
canty hold back the development of new and more advanced tobacco
products.
Id. at 39 (emphasis omitted).
153 See Ludwikowski, supra note 137, at 114 (citing data from Robert T. Garett, Tobacco
Plan a Free-Speech Issue? Don't Kid Yourself, COURIER-J., Aug. 13, 1995, at ID). Ludwikowski
asserts that "[i]n light of the existing prohibition of tobacco sales to minors, a link between
tobacco advertising and consumption by young people is presumably less apparent." I&.
Therefore, the author argues that "ta]lthough young people may easily be able to recall
cigarette ads, this correlation does not necessarily indicate that minors are likely to smoke
because of the advertising." Id. But see FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,332 (citing
considerable empirical evidence on the effects of cigarette advertising on young people);
Ludwikowski, supra note 137, at 114 n.116 ("Ever since the 'Joe Camel' advertising cam-
paign came into effect, the 'share of teens who smoke Camels jumped from 8 to 13 per-
cent; the proportion of adults choosing Camels stayed stable.'" (quoting Kids Mustn't
Smoke; Clinton's Right to Regulate Nicotine As a Drug, Although His Limits On Ads Go Too Far,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1995, at A18)).
154 See Ludwikowski, supra note 137, at 114 (citing Jacob Sullum, supra note 137, at
G1).
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sumption, the FDA restrictions on tobacco products fail to advance
the government objective of decreasing teen smoking in a direct and
material way.
The FDA rule also fails the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test: whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve the
asserted governmental interest.' 55 Although the Supreme Court re-
laxed this standard requiring only a-reasonable fit between the-regula-
tion and the government's interest, the means chosen by the
government still must be narrowly tailored. 56 Restricting tobacco ad-
vertisements in publications with youth readership of fifteen percent
or more to black-and-white, text-only format 57 infringes on the truth-
ful dissemination of tobacco advertisements to the eighty-five percent
adult readers. 158 Professor Martin Redish explains:
[r]estrictions on the use of color and imagery do more than inter-
fere with creative self-realization. They also significantly interfere
with the communicator's ability to reach the intended audience....
Moreover, a speaker's ability to choose the manner of expression
should not be viewed as uniquely tied to the speaker's developmen-
tal interest, but to the listener's free speech rights as well.159
The ban on tobacco advertising within one thousand feet of any
school or playground 160 is also broader than necessary, because the
regulation applies to all outdoor advertising and fails to adequately
protect advertising in zoned commercial areas.' 6 ' A ban on the sale
or distribution of branded nontobacco items such as hats and tee-
shirts 62 extends beyond protecting children and adolescents, because
it restricts adults from purchasing these items. Similarly, the restric-
155 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
156 See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring a fit "that employs
not necessarily the least restrictive means but, .. . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective.").
157 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 41,399, 44,513.
158 See supra text accompanying note 47.
159 Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IowA L REv. 589,
627 (1996).
160 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 41,399, 44,502.
161 This regulation is broader than the Baltimore outdoor advertising restriction up-
held in Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor ofBaltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated sub
nom. Penn Adver. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575, aff'd on reh' 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
In Penn Advertising the court upheld a Baltimore ordinance that prohibited the placement
of any sign that "advertises cigarettes in a publicly visible location," i.e. on "outdoor bill-
boards, sides of building[s], and free standing signboards." Id. at 1321. However, that
regulation contained exceptions permitting such advertising on buses, taxicabs, commer-
cial vehicles used to transport cigarettes, signs at businesses licensed to sell cigarettes, and
in certain commercially and industrially zoned areas of the city. See id. The FDA rule
would prohibit any outdoor advertising within one thousand feet from a school without
any exceptions.
162 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399, 44,521.
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don limiting sponsorship of events to the corporate name only168 se-
verely limits tobacco companies from marketing their products to the
adult consumer. As the Court affirmed in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts Corp.,164 the state may not "reduce the adult population... to
reading only what is fit for children."165 Therefore, the ban is more
restrictive than necessary to meet its objective of protecting minors.
There are less restrictive alternatives than these broad prohibi-
tions that could decrease the number of minors who smoke and be-
come addicted to tobacco products. Some suggestions include
government and corporate sponsored educational programs, subsi-
dized medical programs to treat tobacco addiction, increased taxes on
tobacco products in order to price tobacco products out of the reach
of children, and stricter enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale of
cigarettes to minors under eighteen. 166 All of these options would ad-
vance the government's interest with less intrusion on tobacco compa-
nies' First Amendment rights.'67
If courts follow the intermediate scrutiny of the Central Hudson
balancing test, the FDA's tobacco advertising restrictions fail to signifi-
cantly advance the government's interest in protecting the health of
minors. Rather, the restrictions eliminate information from adult
consumers. Therefore, a proper application of Central Hudson would
allow tobacco advertisers to disseminate truthful and lawful informa-
tion to consumers. 168
A deferential application of the balancing test, however, would
result in the validation of these FDA restrictions. Courts reviewing
restrictions on advertising of harmful products in recent cases have
misapplied the Central Hudson test and have accepted the legislative
163 See id. at 44,399, 44,527.
164 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unso-
licited advertisements for contraceptives violates the First Amendment).
165 Id. at 73-74 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). Indiana Uni-
versity law professor Patrick Baude opined that "[y]oung people don't have the same right
to these materials as adults, but it's also established that these materials can't be withheld
from adults to keep them from reaching children." Brown, supra note 47, at IA.
166 See Edwards, supra note 145, at 173; Ludwikowski, supra note 137, at 116.
167 For similar reasoning, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495,
1510 (1996) (finding that a state cannot satisfy the requirement that a price advertising
ban on alcoholic beverages be no more extensive than necessary because temperance can
be achieved through less intrusive means such as higher prices, taxation, and educational
campaigns); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593 (1985) (finding available
alternatives to a labeling ban of alcohol content).
168 A proper application would be consistent with the Court's language in Vrginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vruginia Citizens Consumer CounciL See 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("Advertis-
ing, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of




judgment that advertising increases consumption. 16 9 The Penn Adver-
tising decision demonstrates the need for the Supreme Court to con-
tinue to tighten the commercial speech balancing test in order to
evaluate all truthful advertisements of legal products consistently. In
Penn Advertising, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Baltimore ordinance that
prohibited the placement of any sign that "advertises cigarettes in a
publicly visible location," such as on "outdoor billboards, sides of
building[s], and free standing signboards," but included exceptions
for advertising on certain vehicles and at "businesses licensed to sell
cigarettes."' 7 0
The Fourth Circuit scrutinized the regulation under the four-
prong Central Hudson test.'7 1 First, the court found that the speech
pertained to lawful activity and was not misleading. 172 Second, the
court agreed that the government's substantial interest was to pro-
mote compliance with state prohibition of cigarette sales to minors,
and to prevent the purchase and consumption of cigarettes by mi-
nors. 173 Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered the third and fourth
prongs of the balancing test regarding the fit between the City's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish them.174 Relying on the legisla-
ture's reasonable belief that the means selected would advance its
ends, the court found that the City had met its burden of proving that
its regulation would directly advance the interest of reducing cigarette
consumption by minors.' 75 As for evaluation of the "least restrictive
means," the court gave the City reasonable latitude to address the
problem. 176 In upholding the statute, the court relied heavily on the
169 The Fourth Circuit affirmed its decision to uphold restrictions on outdoor advertis-
ing of tobacco and alcohol products notwithstanding the Supreme Court's Liquormart deci-
sion. See Penn Adver. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), aff'g, 63 F.3d
1318 (4th Cir. 1995); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996), af'g
63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
170 Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1321. On the same day, the court upheld a Baltimore
ordinance that restricted the placement of signs that advertise alcoholic beverages in "pub-
licly visible locations," but with the same exceptions as the ordinance for cigarettes. See
Anheser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1308-09.




175 See id. ('There is a logical nexus between the city's objective and the means it se-
lected for achieving that objective, and it is not necessary, in satisfying Central Hudson's
third prong, to prove conclusively that the correlation in fact exists, or that the steps un-
dertaken will solve the problem.").
176 See id. at 1326 ("In the face of a problem as significant as that which the City seeks
to address, the City must be given some reasonable latitude."). See also Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1316 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.Ct. 1821, aff'd on reh'g,
101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328, 346-47 (1996), Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981),
and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
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deferential standard set forth in many Supreme Court opinions.177
Such a deferential balancing inquiry maintains a low level of judicial
scrutiny for commercial speech regulations.
Some commentary favors deferential review for evaluating regula-
tions of advertisements of harmful products. One author argues that
"[s]uch deference is appropriate because a thorough judicial inquiry
would require the court to duplicate the legislative process. A court is
not equipped to review the conclusion that there is a link between
advertising and consumption without the fact-finding mechanisms of
the legislature.' 78 Court opinions evaluating restrictions on alcohol
advertisements posit this deferential standard. In Dunagin v. City of
Oxford,' 79 the court deferred to the legislature's belief that suppres-
sion of advertising promoted the state's interest in decreasing alcohol
consumption. °80 In Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp,181 the court de-
ferred to the state legislature's decision to ban liquor advertisements
and found the policy choice not "constitutionally unreasonable." 182
This deferential approach rejects the stringent requirement that the
government needs to prove a direct and material link between its reg-
ulation and its interest. Professor Sylvia A. Law explains that "It]he
leading scholarly defense of broad state authority to restrict tobacco
advertising rejects the notion that the state should be required to
demonstrate an empirical connection between suppression of com-
mercial speech and an important state goal."'83 Therefore, courts
might apply a deferential standard to tobacco advertisements. 184
Under such a standard, the government could easily show a link
between its regulation and the substantial interest in lowering tobacco
consumption. The government would only have to demonstrate that
the legislature or agency reasonably believed that the regulation di-
rectly advanced the asserted governmental interest. 185 As the Court
177 See Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325-26; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1311-16.
178 Berman, supra note 128, at 1210.
'79 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (upholding a ban on locally produced
alcohol advertising).
180 See id. at 748 n.8 (stating that a legislative finding could not be put aside by two
experts and a judicial trier of fact).
181 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding a ban on wine advertisements), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
182 Id. at 501. But see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116S. Ct. 1495, 1509 (1996)
(requiring the State to show that its alcohol advertising ban would advance its interest to a
material degree, and stating that "without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary
support whatsoever, we cannot agree with the assertion that the price advertising ban will
significantly advance the State's interest in promoting temperance.").
183 Law, supra note 8, at 937-38 (quoting Vincent Blasi& Henry P. Monaghan, The First
Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256JAMA 502, 508 (1986) ("To demand such proof of
legislative facts would render government unworkable.")).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
185 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986).
The Court stated that "[tihe Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted
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stated in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,' 8 6 "Within the bounds of
the general protection provided by the Constitution to commercial
speech, we allow room for legislative judgments.' 18 7 The FDA re-
viewed numerous studies when drafting its proposed rule. 88 Follow-
ing a deferential standard, the FDA's belief that the means it selected
will advance its ends appears reasonable.'8 9 For the fourth prong of
the test, one must determine whether the regulation is not more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve the government's interest. 90 Applying
a loose application of the standard, a court would defer to the agency
to determine whether an alternative was as effective as an advertising
restriction.' 91 Essentially, this means that under such a deferential
standard, the FDA would have wide latitude to address the significant
problem of tobacco consumption by minors through advertising
restrictions.' 92
The FDA rule might also survive First Amendment scrutiny under
the plurality's test set forth in Liquormart.193 Using this approach, the
Court might characterize the FDA rule as a partial ban meant to pro-
tect minors from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices.
Therefore, the regulation would be subjected to a less than strict re-
view, and it would likely be upheld as a legitimate partial ban.' 94
In this latest battle against tobacco products, commercial speech
advocates and commentators have sounded the alarm in response to a
possible loose application of the Central Hudson balancing test for re-
strictions on advertisements of lawful, but harmful, products. In a
statement criticizing the FDA rule, American Association of Advertis-
ing Agencies Executive Vice President Harold A. Shoup said, "We are
concerned about the rights of marketers to advertise legal products
and the precedent this would set for other politically correct [sic] but
the advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the
residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised."
Id. at 341-42.
186 509 U.S. 418 (1993)
187 Id. at 434 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
188 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
189 For a similar test applied in a tobacco advertisement case, see supra text accompa-
nying note 175.
190 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
191 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986)
("We think it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech'
policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on
advertising.").
192 For a similar test applied in a tobacco advertisement case, see supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
193 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507 (1996). See also test
cited supra note 118 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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legal products." 95 Regarding a deferential application of the Central
Hudson standard to advertisements of tobacco products and the impli-
cation of such a loose application for other products, Professor Sylvia
A. Law warned:
[I] f courts must defer to the legislative determination that suppres-
sion promotes state interests, the Central Hudson standard provides
little protection for commercial speech.... The state legitimately
could assert an interest in discouraging consumption of many prod-
ucts including beef, sugar, dairy products, fast automobiles, cloth-
ing, and cosmetics that promote gender or sexual ideals that the
state deems inappropriate. The state probably could not demon-
strate, in any rigorous way, a connection between suppression of
such advertisements and a substantial state interest. Nevertheless,
under a loosely applied Central Hudson standard such regulations
might be upheld.196
Courts have baffled advertisers and consumers with an inconsis-
tent application of the Central Hudson test. If the commercial speech
doctrine protects the dissemination of truthful information about en-
tirely lawful activity from legislators who fear the information's impact
upon its disseminators and its recipients, 197 then judicial scrutiny
should remain consistent in evaluating a regulation against any truth-
ful, nonmisleading advertisement of lawful products. The Coors and
Liquormart cases clarified that the Central Hudson test requires the
courts to independently review commercial speech regulations. 198
However, the history of commercial speech jurisprudence indicates
that the Court applies a rigorous balancing test in some cases, 199 yet
relaxes the very same test in other cases. 200 In addition, lower courts
seem content to apply a deferential review of state regulations that
ban types of alcohol and tobacco advertisements. 201
Under such a deferential standard, free speech advocates and ad-
vertisers have legitimate concerns about the extent of the govern-
ment's power to regulate commercial speech. The following section
will examine the problems with the current Central Hudson test in its
inconsistent application to advertising restrictions of truthful, nonmis-
leading advertisements of lawful products. These problems highlight
the very reason the Court must continue to clarify the Central Hudson
195 Hernandez, supra note 47, at 12. The article quoted Mr. Shoup as saying "politi-
cally correct"; however, he was referring to harmful products and could only have meant
.politically incorrect."
196 Law, supra note 8, at 937.
197 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 773 (1976).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04, 107-11.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 86-94, 102-05, 107-11.
200 See supra text accompanying notes, 73-84, 95-98, 106.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 115-16, 169-77, 179-82.
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balancing test and strengthen the protections accorded commercial
speech under the First Amendment.
C. Commercial Speech Balancing: The Court's Inconsistent
Treatment of Regulations Endangers All Truthful
Advertisements
There are two problems with the current Central Hudson balanc-
ing test when applied with varying degrees of scrutiny to advertising
restrictions. First, the Court has ignored the rights of the listener as
an important element in First Amendment protection. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,20 2 the
Court protected the right of the consumer to receive information.20 3
The Court stated that "the protection afforded is to the communica-
tion, to its source and to its recipient both.... If there is a right to
advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising .... -"204
However, when the Court wants to uphold regulations against adver-
tisements of harmful products, the rights of the consumer seem to
disappear from the analysis. Second, a deferential application of the
balancing test to commercial speech regulations aimed at limiting the
consumption of harmful products could, in effect, lead the govern-
ment to discourage the use of a variety of legal products.205 Free
speech advocates explain the possible spiraling effects, stating that
"[f]irst it was tobacco, then it was alcohol, which is unquestionably
good for you in small amounts; and next it could be high-fat foods,
high-sugar foods, and you don't know where it stops. '20 6 Collectively,
these two problems illustrate the dangers of weakening the First
Amendment protections accorded commercial speech.
1. The First Danger: Ignoring the Rights of the Listener
The first problem indicates that a deferential Central Hudson bal-
ancing test neglects the paramount rights of the listener in commer-
cial speech cases.20 7 In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,208 the Court
summarized the reasons for extending First Amendment protection to
commercial speech:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the
free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his
202 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
203 See id. at 756-57.
204 Id.
205 See Law, supra note 8, at 937 (stating that a loosely applied Central Hudson test might
uphold the government's interest in discouraging the consumption of unhealthy items,
such as beef and sugar, or dangerous products, such as fast automobiles or motorcycles).
206 Claudia Maclachlan, Ad Limits Get Harder to Enact NAT'L Lj.,July 26, 1993, at 1, 29.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 202-04.
208 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal
interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely
commercial, may often carry information of import to significant
issues of the day. And commercial speech serves to inform the pub-
lic of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services,
and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of re-
sources in a free enterprise system. In short, such speech serves in-
dividual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable
decisionmaking. 20 9
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,2 10 the Court highlighted
the value of advertisements. Quoting from colonial literature, the
Court stated, "'[Advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge and en-
lighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enumerated among
the many methods of awakening and maintaining the popular atten-
tion, with which more modem times, beyond all preceding example,
abound.' 2 11 Therefore, truthful advertisements that promote any
lawful product, even harmful ones, facilitate the efficient allocation of
resources in a predominantly free enterprise economy, and allow con-
sumers to make informed economic decisions.212
The Court should adopt a more vigorous, listener-based interpre-
tation of the First Amendment for three reasons. First, the widely ac-
cepted interpretations of the First Amendment fail to protect the
underlying values of commercial speech. 213 Second, First Amend-
mentjurisprudence supports a listener-based value. 214 Finally, this in-
terpretation would result in consistent protection of advertisements
for adult consumers, and it would also provide a rationale for some
protective measures for children in regulating advertisements of
harmful products.2 15 Commentators advance multiple theories as to
209 Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
210 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
211 Id. at 421-22 n.17 (quoting D. BOOPsTIn, THE AMimcAcs: THE COLONIAL ExPERP-
ENcE 415 (1958) (quoting I. THoMAs, HISTORY OF PRNTING IN AMERICA wrrH A BIOGRAPHY
OF PRIN'nr-s, AND AccouNT OF NEWsPAPERs (2d ed. 1810))).
212 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
213 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYTM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESsION 6 (1970) (stating that
freedom of expression advances knowledge and discovery of truth); A. MMIL.EjOHN, PoUT-
icAL- FREEDOM (1960) (arguing for a politically-based interpretation); C. Edwin Baker, Com-
mercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L REv. 1 (1976) (interpreting the
First Amendment as protecting the "individual liberty and self-realization" of the speaker).
214 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (finding the right of
listener to be paramount); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding
that the freedom of speech embraces both a right to distribute and a right to receive
information).
215 Compare Virginia Phanucy, 425 U.S. at 765 ("So long as we preserve a predomi-
nantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.") with Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 n.6 (1968) ("'[T] he power of the state to control the conduct of
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what speech merits First Amendment protection. 216 While these theo-
ries represent popular interpretations of the First Amendment, the
Court does recognize a listener-based value as well.217
One interpretation focuses on the politically-based value of the
First Amendment. This view advances the value of the First Amend-
ment as a paragon of self government and civic virtue.218 Alexander
Meiklejohn, one of the foremost proponents of the politically-based
theory, explains that "[t] he principle of the freedom of speech springs
from the necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a
Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the
basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by uni-
versal suffrage.1219 Therefore, Professor Meiklejohn argues that
"rt] he guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured
to all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or
indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal-only therefore,
to the consideration of matters of public interest."220
In several cases, the Court has supported a First Amendment the-
ory of political awareness and participation. For example, endorsing a
theory that promoted political discussion, Justice Brandeis stated,
"Those who won our independence.., believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth;... that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.1221 In the area of libel, the Court explained
that "we consider this case against the background of a profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on gov-
ernment and public officials." 222 Such language by the Court sup-
ports a politically-based interpretation as one theory of the First
Amendment.
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults ... .'") (quoting Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendmen 72 YALE LJ. 877, 938-39 (1963)).
216 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
218 See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 213.
219 Id. at 27.
220 Id. at 79. Professor Meiklejohn later expanded his theory of First Amendment pro-
tection to include nonpolitical speech about education, philosophy, the social sciences,
literature and the arts as contributing to self-government. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 256-57.
221 Whitey v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,J, concurring), overnuled
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
222 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
1997] 463
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Proponents of this theory, such as Meiklejohn,223 Lillian BeV-
ier,224 and Judge Robert Bork,225 believe that commercial speech falls
outside of First Amendment protection.226 In support of this position,
ThomasJackson andJohnJeffries argue that no justification exists for
protecting commercial speech under the First Amendment.227 The
authors maintain that they were "unable to discover-in the opinion
of the Court, in the secondary literature, or in our reflections-any
other principle that would bring the protection of commercial speech
within the scope of the first amendment."22 Such a narrow interpre-
tation of the First Amendment shortchanges commercial speech in
two respects. First, commercial speech touches a political chord with
the American public. Second, the politically-based theory does not
encompass all of the speech protected by the First Amendment.
The problem with excluding commercial speech from First
Amendment protection based on a politically-based interpretation,
Professor Shiffrin argues, is that "[e]ven if one accepts [the] .. .as-
sumption that the First Amendment is exclusively concerned with
political speech, there is good reason to think that much so-called eco-
nomic regulation touches speech of political importance."229 While
advertisers market a product to entice consumers, advertisements
often raise important political and social issues. For example, one re-
cent controversy focused on Calvin Klein's widely criticized jean adver-
tisements showing teen-age models in provocative poses.23 0 Another
provocative topic involved General Mills' new Betty Crocker and her
darker skin color.23' In defense of protecting commercial speech and
its underlying political connection, Justice Stewart explained that
"[t] he information about price and product conveyed by commercial
advertisements may, of course, stimulate thought and debate about
political questions."23 2 For example, drug price information might
impact a person's views concerning price control issues, government
subsidy proposals, or legislation aimed at health care, consumer pro-
223 See MEIK.EJOHN, supra note 213.
224 See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiy into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 800 (1978).
225 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. Lj.
1, 27-29 (1971).
226 See Thomas Jackson & John Jeffiies, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the
First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1979) (arguing that Meiklejohn's and Bork's polit-
ically-based First Amendment theory does not extend protection to commercial speech).
227 See id. at 13-14.
228 Id. at 14.
229 Shiffin, supra note 71, at 1232.
230 See U.S. Starts Inquiy on Calvin Klein Ads, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1995, at A27.
231 See Elaine W. Shoben, Getting the Skin Color Right', CHt. TirB., Mar. 28, 1996, at 25.
232 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 780 n.8 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tection, or taxation.235 These political issues could equally concern
consumers when exposed to tobacco advertisements. Therefore, ad-
vertisements promoting harmful products might serve the interests of
political discussion, awareness, and participation. 23
Even if commercial speech does not advance political issues,
Court opinions and secondary literature support a broader reading of
the First Amendment than the view expressed by Jackson and Jef-
fries.23 5 Professor Shiffrin explains, "The Court has been unwilling to
confine the first amendment to a single value or even to a few val-
ues."236 The Court has advocated other First Amendment theories be-
sides the politically-based interpretation, namely a marketplace of
ideas model.237 In addition, a politically-based interpretation would
fail to protect artistic and scientific speech although both types of
speech provides citizens a forum for ideas and education. 238
Another First Amendment interpretation values the rights of the
speaker but often forgets the rights of the listener. C. Edwin Baker
bases his interpretation of the First Amendment on the self-expression
of the speaker.239 Baker states that "[a]s long as speech represents the
freely-chosen expression of the speaker while depending for its power
on the free acceptance of the listener, freedom of speech represents a
charter of liberty for noncoercive action."240 Baker argues that the
First Amendment does not protect speech which "does not represent
an attempt to create or affect the world in a way which can be ex-
233 See id.
234 See GARTNER, supra note 152, at 22-23. The author states, "Commercial speech and
political speech cannot be separated ... all commercial speech is political by its very na-
ture. No commercial speech is entirely devoid of noncommercial, political, or social impli-
cations." Id. at 22. Therefore, Gartner argues, "All information about the quality and price
of products potentially relates to important political issues. In our complex society, all
issues that affect attitudes about access to needed goods and services are political issues."
Id. at 23.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 226-28.
236 Shifflin, supra note 71, at 1252.
237 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Under this theory, Holmes stated:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. at 630. The marketplace of ideas theory traces its roots to the writings ofJohn Stuart
Mill. SeejoHN S. MIiLL, ON LBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859).
238 Even Meiklejohn, the foremost proponent of the political-based interpretation,
concedes that First Amendment protection embraces some nonpolitical speech. See
Meiklejohn, supranote 220, at 256-57. Meiklejohn specifically argues for the protection of
artistic and scientific speech. See id. at 257, 263.
239 See Baker, supra note 213, at 7.
240 Id.
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pected to represent anyone's private or personal wishes."24' There-
fore, the author concludes that commercial speech should remain
unprotected because advertisements represent corporate profit mo-
tives and market forces rather than individual expression.242 This
view, however, ignores one of the important values of commercial
speech. Martin Redish posits that the First Amendment should pro-
tect commercial speech to advance the value of allowing individuals to
control decisions that affect their lives.243 Redish argues that "if the
first amendment right consists at least in part of the listener's right to
receive information, then the speaker's motive logically should be ir-
relevant to the analysis."244 Therefore, Baker's speaker-centered inter-
pretation neglects the underlying values of commercial speech.
Thomas I. Emerson advances a more inclusive view, arguing that
the First Amendment protects speech to discover the truth.245 Emer-
son states that "freedom of expression is an essential process for ad-
vancing knowledge and discovering truth. An individual who seeks
knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question, consider all
alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and make
full use of different minds. '246 A similar theory advancing the discov-
ery of truth derives from Justice Holmes' marketplace of ideas.247
Under this theory, truth will emerge in the marketplace when ideas
compete freely.24s While this theory provides a vehicle for commer-
cial speech in the marketplace of ideas, it still does not advance the
protection of commercial speech for the value of the consumer's right
to receive information and make every day determinations, regardless
of whether the ultimate truth would emerge from the speech. Redish
explains the value of commercial speech from a consumer perspec-
tive, stating that
[w]hen the individual is presented with rational grounds for prefer-
ring one product or brand over another, he is encouraged to con-
sider the competing information, weigh it mentally in the light of
the goals of personal satisfaction he has set for himself, counter-
balance his conclusions with possible price differentials, and in so
doing exercise his abilities to reason and think; this aids him to-
wards the intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment 2 49
241 Id. at 3.
242 See generally Baker, supra note 213.
248 See M. REDiSH, FREEDOM OF ExPtEssIoN: A CRicAL ANALYsis 19-29 (1984).
244 Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression
and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1433, 1447 (1990).
245 See generally EMERSON, supra note 213.
246 Id. at 6-7.
247 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
248 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
249 Martin H. Redish, First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values
of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L Rxv. 429, 443-44 (1971).
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The lengthy commentary provides many theories which lead to
only one conclusion, namely that no single theory completely explains
the First Amendment. Professor Shiffrin observes that "first amend-
ment literature has exploded with commentary finding first amend-
ment values involving liberty, self realization, autonomy, the
marketplace of ideas, equality, self-government, checking govern-
ment, and more."250 With all the interpretations that attempt to unite
First Amendment jurisprudence, a listener-based theory would offer
commercial speech consistent protection from government
regulation.
A listener-based model has a rich history in First Amendment ju-
risprudence. In the 1940s, the Court first recognized the rights of the
public to receive information. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,21
the Court found that the Communications Act of 1934 did not protect
a licensee against competition, but rather did protect the public.2 52
In Martin v. City of Struthers,25s the Court stated explicitly that the right
of freedom of speech "embraces the right to distribute literature, and
necessarily protects the right to receive it."24 In Thomas v. Collins,255
the labor registration statute restricted the rights of the organizer to
speak and the workers to hear the information.2 56 In Marsh v. Ala-
bama,257 the Court recognized that the preservation of a free society
depends upon the right of each individual citizen to receive litera-
ture.2 58 The Court also recognized this right in Lamont v. Postmaster
Genera4259 where an addressee had an affirmative First Amendment
right not to be unjustifiably burdened by a statute.260 The Court also
discussed the public's right to receive information in privacy cases.
For example, in Stanley v. Georgia,261 the Court stated that "[ i lt is now
well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive in-
250 Shiffirin, supra note 71, at 1252.
251 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (holding that the Communications Act of 1934 did not protect
a broadcast licensee from the FCC granting a new license to a proposed new station).
252 See id. at 475.
253 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (holding an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation
unconstitutional).
254 Id. at 143 (citation omitted).
255 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (finding a statute requiring labor organizers to register before
soliciting membership unconstitutional as a prior restraint).
256 See id. at 534.
257 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding a right to distribute literature in a company-owned
town).
258 See id. at 505.
259 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (upholding the First Amendment right of citizens to receive
political publications sent from abroad).
260 See id. at 305.
261 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting an individual's privacy interest in possessing ob-
scene material in his own home).
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formation and ideas." 262 In furthering the rights of listeners, the
Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,2 63 stated that "[iut is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial
here."26 In commercial speech, the Court made the logical connec-
tion between the consumer and the right to receive advertised infor-
mation.26 5 This Supreme Court precedent recognizes the right of the
consumer to receive information as a separate right under the First
Amendment.
Since the Court extended the First Amendment's reach to in-
clude a right of the consumer to know and to receive information,
commercial speech merits full First Amendment protection because
of its utilitarian value to the listener in his or her role as economic
decisionmaker.2 66 When the Court protects the advertisements of
drug prices267 or information about electric utility services,2 68 the
opinions place importance on the consumer's need to receive infor-
mation. However, when courts uphold restrictions on advertisements
of casino gambling,2 69 lotteries,2 70 alcoholic beverages,271 and tobacco
products,2 72 the same need for information disappears from the judi-
cial opinions. This inconsistent treatment of the public's right to
know endangers the value of economic decisionmaking. When com-
mercial speech initially received First Amendment protection, the
Court highlighted this value, stating that for private economic deci-
sions to be intelligent and well-informed, "the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper
262 Id. at 564. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (recognizing
that the First Amendment also protects the right to distribute, the right to receive, and the
right to read).
263 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the FCC's fairness doctrine requiring a balanced
representation of controversial ideas of public importance).
264 Id. at 890.
265 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Unlike most commercial speech cases, the consumers brought suit
against the state restriction to advertising. The Court answered affirmatively that both the
consumers and the advertisers enjoy First Amendment protection attached to the flow of
drug price information. See id. at 756.
266 See Richard T. Kaplar, The FDA and the First Amendment, in BAD PRFSCRIPTION FOR
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FDA CENSORSHIP OF DRUG ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION 43, 56
(Richard T. Kaplar ed., 1993).
267 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
268 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
269 See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 828 (1986).
270 See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
271 SeeAnheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 1821, affd on reh' 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d
738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
272 See Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated




allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensa-
ble to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered."273 This indispensable free flow of
commercial information is necessary for all lawful products, even
harmful ones. One commentator observed, "Even well-intentioned re-
strictions that seek to protect the public-such as the prohibition
against cigarette ads on television-are highly paternalistic, underesti-
mating the public's ability to recognize the limits of advertising."274
Therefore, the rights of the listener should remain the driving force
behind judicial review of commercial speech regulations.
Many theories have offered unifying themes for First Amendment
jurisprudence, but the Court has not relied on any one to decide
speech cases. Professor Shiffrin explains, "[T]he Court has been gen-
erous about the range of values relevant in first amendment theory,
and unreceptive to those who ask it to confine first amendment values
to a particular favorite." 275 The listener-based theory adds another
perspective to First Amendment jurisprudence. 276 The fact that the
speech comes from a corporation or a company should not alter the
interests of the consumer.277 In the context of noncommercial
speech, the Court stated that "the Court's decisions involving corpora-
tions in the business of communication or entertainment are based
not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual
self-expression but also on its role in affording the public access to
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas."278 If advertisements, in part, advance the interests of the con-
sumers to make informed decisions for their own self, the same ration-
ale for the dissemination of information and ideas extends to
commercial speech.279 This same rationale should further extend to
advertisements that disseminate information about harmful products,
such as cigarettes. Advertising harmful products still informs the con-
sumer about details of the product, its -producer, and its price. 280
Court decisions that use the Central Hudson test to uphold advertising
restrictions of harmful products often ignore the right of consumers
to make self-informed, economic decisions.
273 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (citations omitted).
274 GARTNER, supra note 152, at 25.
275 Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 1252.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 251-65.
277 , See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 455 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.").
278 Id. at 783.
279 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
280 See id. at 765.
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2. The Second Danger: Regulating the Advertising of More Legal
Products
The second problem with a deferential Central Hudson analysis
illustrates the harmful effects of the government's broad power to re-
strict truthful, nonmisleading advertisements of lawful products. If
courts uphold regulations aimed at decreasing consumption of harm-
fial products, then the same logic could apply to other products, thus
creating a slippery slope.281 One commentator observed that
"[g]overnment restrictions on certain types of speech can ultimately
become restrictions on all speech... [R] estrictions on one group of
commercial speakers .. .can ultimately become restrictions on all
commercial speakers."282 If a state has a legitimate interest in protect-
ing people from harmful products, such as cigarettes, then a state
could regulate the advertisements of other products.283
A recent Ninth Circuit case provides an example of how a loose
Central Hudson test can be extended to other kinds of products. In
Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren,284 the court upheld a
California law that made it unlawful for a manufacturer or distributor
of consumer goods to advertise its products as environmentally-safe
unless the goods complied with statutory definitions.285 The undis-
puted government interest in ensuring truthful environmental adver-
tising and encouraging recycling satisfied the second prong of the
Central Hudson balancing test.2 6 The court found that the regulation
directly advanced the governmental interest in protecting the con-
sumers against "green marketing."28 7 The court only required a rea-
sonable belief that the advertising increased the demand for a
281 See Maclachlan, supra note 206, at 1.
282 Richard T. Kaplar, Conclusion: Valuing Freedom of Speech, in BAD PREScIwPTION FOR
THE FIRST AMENDMENT. FDA CENSORSHIP OF DRUG ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION, supra note
266, at 118.
283 See Law, supra note 8, at 987 (noting that a substantial interest in protecting people
could lead to discouraging consumption of many products including beef, sugar, dairy
products, fitst automobiles, clothing, and cosmetics that promote gender or sexual ideals
that the state deems inappropriate); Weber & Marks, supra note 130, at 81 (statement of
Weber) (arguing that a substantial interest in protecting people from the grave harm
caused by cigarettes could be applied to a variety of activities other than smoking, such as
handguns, motorcycle riding, boxing, playing football, auto racing, or liquor
consumption).
284 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995).
285 See id. at 727 (restricting the use of the terms "ozone friendly," "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable," "recyclable," and "recycled").
286 See id. at 732.
287 See id. (defining "green marketing" as increased sales of goods as a result of poten-




product.288 The court stated, that "the nexus between advertising,
consumer demand and the asserted governmental interests is suffi-
ciently close. Although comprehensive economic data are lacking,
the record contains abundant support for the proposition that green
marketing boosts consumer demand for the allegedly recycled or bi-
odegradable product."28 9 This opinion differs from the Supreme
Court's intermediate scrutiny of the third prong requiring the regula-
tion to directly advance the govermnent's interests to a material de-
gree.290 However, the Lungren opinion resembles the deferential
Supreme Court cases that allow the legislature to regulate advertising
on the premise that it increases demand for the product.291
The desire to protect consumers from harmful or potentially mis-
leading advertisements should not compromise the constitutionally
mandated commercial speech balancing test. A relaxed standard has
already led to restrictions on advertisements for gambling, tobacco,
and alcohol.292 This same deferential standard has been extended to
advertisements for other legal products.293 This standard then could
logically apply to an advertising regulation of any product if the courts
find that the legislatures or agencies reasonably believed the regula-
tion would protect consumers. The Central Hudson test would then
prove ineffective in protecting all truthful commercial speech if courts
relaxed their review for some regulations. 294
The Central Hudson test established intermediate scrutiny as the
proper standard for reviewing commercial speech regulations.295 But,
the Court has applied that balancing test inconsistently during the
past twenty years. 296 As a result, courts often fail to recognize the right
of the consumer to receive commercial information. 297 This problem
poses a danger to all truthful, nonmisleading advertisements because
it remains unclear when the Central Hudson test will be applied to pro-
288 See id. at 733 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 828,
342 (1986), for the proposition that the court need not look further than the reasonable-
ness of the legislature's belief regarding a link between advertising and demand).
289 Id.
290 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). In Edenfield, the Court
decided that the Board of Accountancy did not present any comprehensive studies to
demonstrate that a ban on CPA solicitation would advance its asserted interests in any
direct and material way. See id. at 771.
291 See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993); Posadas, 478 U.S. at
342.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 95-98, 169-77, 179-82.
293 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (attorney advertis-
ing); Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.d 726 (9th Cir. 1994) (envi-
ronmental advertising), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995).
294 See supra text accompanying note 196.
295 See supra Part HA
296 See supra Part IIA
297 See supra Part II.C.1.
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vide meaningful review. The FDA rule on tobacco advertising reflects
the tension between the substantial interest in protecting minors from
tobacco addiction and the recognized protection for commercial
speech. A proper application of First Amendment scrutiny warrants
striking down the FDA rule because it falls to advance in a direct and
material way the government's interest in protecting minors, and be-
cause it is more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.29 8 How-
ever, a deferential application might uphold these same restrictions
on tobacco advertising finding that they are reasonably tailored to the
government's interest in protecting minors.299 These divergent re-
sults pose a threat to commercial speech that could spread easily to
other advertisements and products. The next Part suggests an alterna-
tive that would confront tobacco addiction and smoking problems
among minors without weakening commercial speech protections.
III
A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION TO KILL THE CANCER WITHIN
Even though the First Amendment protects commercial speech,
some tobacco regulations should survive constitutional scrutiny.
Courts, however, must not uphold such valid regulations at the ex-
pense of lawful advertising of other products. The following proposed
solution both strengthens the protection for commercial speech and
recognizes the legitimate concern of preventing smoking by
minors.3 00
The Court should reconsider the entire Central Hudson balancing
test in order to further the First Amendment values of a marketplace
of information and a better-informed citizenry.30 ' Throughout the
Court's treatment of commercial speech, several justices have warned
that the current test fails to adequately protect truthful, noncoercive
advertising.30 2 Justice Stevens argued:
298 See supra Part II.B.
299 See supra Part II.B.
300 This author hopes, like Justice Blackmun, that "the Court ultimately will come to
abandon Central Hudson's analysis entirely in favor of one that affords full protection for
truthful, noncoercive commercial speech about lawful activities." City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 438 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring). However, this
Note recognizes the Court's reluctance to abandon the intermediate scrutiny test for com-
mercial speech. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995) (stating that
"Central Hudson identified several factors that courts should consider in determining
whether a regulation of commercial speech survives First Amendment scrutiny.... .").
301 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 769-70 (1976).
302 For example, Justice Blackmun consistently questioned the Central Hudson test,
stating:
[I)ntermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a restraint on commercial speech
designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive speech, or a
regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial speech. I
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Any "interest" in restricting the flow of accurate information be-
cause of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema to the
First Amendment .... [T]he Constitution is most skeptical of sup-
posed state interests that seek to keep people in the dark for what
the government believes to be their own good.303
The overall inconsistency of the "commercial speech" doctrine, ac-
cording to Stevens, "is that the Court sometimes takes such paternalis-
tic motives seriously."3 04 The Court needs to recast the values of
commercial speech for the consumer and society and question
whether the current test protects the dissemination of truthful adver-
tisements of lawful products.
Such an inquiry should lead to an approach that allows regula-
tions for misleading or coercive speech, but protects truthful, nonmis-
leading advertisements. This approach would reflect a listener-based
First Amendment perspective to protect commercial speech, but it
would still allow certain kinds of government regulation that would
not be permitted for noncommercial speech. 05 Although the Court
should adopt this more protective approach, the Court will probably
not abandon the Central Hudson analysis for truthful advertise-
ments.306 Therefore, the underlying value of private, informed deci-
sionmaking for the listener should guide the Court in its application
of the Central Hudson test. The Court should consistently require that
the government prove that its regulation of any truthful advertisement
of lawful products advances a substantial interest in a direct and mate-
rial way.307 This burden requires the Court to carefully consider the
regulation, analyzing the link between the proffered regulation and
do not agree, however, that the Court's four-part test is the proper one to
be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in
order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or
has not regulated or outlawed directly.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
303 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1597 (1995) (Steven, J., concurring).
See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769 (striking down a regulation banning pharmacists
from listing drug prices because "on close inspection it is seen that the State's protective-
ness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in
ignorance.").
304 Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1597 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Edge
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328 (1986)).
305 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 433-34 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., concurring). The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
allows commercial speech regulations against false, misleading, or illegal advertisements.
See id. at 432.
306 See supra note 300.
307 See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (not requiring the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the regulation is 100% complete, or that the manner of restric-
tion is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end).
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the substantial interest.308 In addition, the regulation must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.309
The commercial speech doctrine compels this rigorous scrutiny
for three reasons. First, the government will pay closer attention to its
regulations, thus accomplishing its objective narrowly without overly
infringing upon speech. Second, the Court can return consistent re-
view to commercial speech regulations so that lower courts can prop-
erly apply the standards to all advertising restrictions including those
aimed at harmful products. Finally, a rigorous review would recognize
the rights of the consumer as the paramount underlying considera-
tion for commercial advertisements.
While a proper intermediate review would protect tobacco adver-
tisements from excessive regulations,3 10 the government could en-
force advertising restrictions to protect minors from the harmful
effects of tobacco.3 11 Such tailored restrictions would survive First
Amendment scrutiny without damaging the commercial speech doc-
trine. The Court analyzes restrictions aimed at minors differently,
thus resulting in a willingness to limit constitutional protections in or-
der to protect children.3 12 In Bellotti v. Baird,313 the Court explained
the difference between constitutional protections for adults and chil-
308 See supra notes 107-11, 145 and accompanying text.
309 See Fo., 492 U.S. at 480.
310 See supra text accompanying notes 146-68.
311 The Fourth Circuit made this argument in upholding its prior decisions restricting
outdoor advertising of tobacco and alcohol products after the Supreme Court remanded
both cases for review in light of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
See Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 382, 333 (4th Cir. 1996), affg63 F.3d
1318 (4th Cir. 1995); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1996),
affg 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995). Differentiating the Baltimore regulation of outdoor
advertising of alcohol products from Liquormart's restrictions, the Fourth Circuit stated:
In contrast to Rhode Island's desire to enforce adult temperance through
an artificial budgetary constraint, Baltimore's interest is to protect children
who are not yet independently able to assess the value of the message
presented. This decision thus conforms to the Supreme Court's repeated
recognition that children deserve special solicitude in the First Amendment
balance because they lack the ability to assess and analyze fully the informa-
tion presented through commercial media.
Anheuser-Busch, 101 F.3d at 329.
312 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (upholding the FCC's
power to regulate indecent speech over the radio, in part because of greater restrictions
when the state's interest in protecting children is involved); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968) (upholding a law prohibiting the sale of sexualy-explicit magazines to minors
under the age of 17 because it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to
material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (sustaining the conviction of a child's guardian for violating a child labor law
prohibiting minors from selling merchandise in public). The Prince Court stated, "[T]he
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults.... " Id. at 170.
313 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (examining when the state may require parental consent
before allowing a minor to have an abortion).
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dren, stating that "although children generally are protected by the
same constitutional guarantees against governmental- deprivations as
are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, . . . sympathy,
and... parental attention.' '3 14 The Court has recognized a "compel-
ling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors."3 15 With this distinction between adults and minors, the
Court could apply a similar division for tobacco advertisements.
When the government interest focuses on protecting minors
from illegal smoking and the influence of tobacco advertisements, 31 6
regulations should narrowly address this problem. As long as tobacco
products are legal, the adult population should remain informed in
order to make personal choices about tobacco use. The concern that
minors cannot make reasoned choices given the potent influence of
glamorous advertising weighs in favor of more restrictions designed to
protect young people.3 17 Professor Emerson explains, "The world of
children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The
factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose differ-
ent rules."318 Therefore, this factor may justify a ban on advertising to
which children have unavoidable access, such as billboard
advertising.31 9
Once advertising restrictions encroach upon the rights of adult
consumers, the regulations cross the permissible line. The Court af-
firmed the principle that the state may not restrict the rights of the
adult population to protect only what is fit for children.320 For exam-
ple, the proposed FDA rule, which in part restricts advertisements in
514 Id. at 635 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
315 Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing the compel-
ling state interest in protecting minors from obscene material, but striking down a total
ban against indecent dial-a-porn because the statute exceeded what was necessary to pro-
tect minors).
316 See FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,397-99. Since it is illegal for children to smoke
cigarettes, the government rationale is that the FDA restrictions address the problem of
advertisers marketing tobacco products to them. See Clinton 1995 Press Conference, supra
note 9. President Clinton stated, "[I]t cannot be a violation of the freedom of speech in
this country to say that you cannot advertise to entice people to do something which they
cannot legally do." Id. at 10.
317 See Clinton 1995 Press Conference, supra note 9. President Clinton observed that
"we all know that teenagers are especially susceptible to pressures. Pressure to the manipu-
lation of mass media advertising, the pressure of the seduction of skilled marketing cam-
paigns aimed at exploiting their insecurities and uncertainties about life." Id. at 1.
318 Emerson, supra note 215, at 939. Emerson concluded that "it suffices to say that
regulations of communication addressed to [children] need not conform to the require-
ments of the first amendment in the same way as those applicable to adults." Id.
319 For a similar argument, see Edwards, supra note 145, at 178 n.185.
320 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983); Butler v. Michi-
gan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
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magazines with adult readers and limits sponsorship of events to the
corporate name, regulates more advertising than necessary to meet
the interests of protecting minors.32 ' Regulations aimed at protecting
the physical well-being of children satisfy a compelling state interest
test, but these restrictions must be narrowly tailored to affect only chil-
dren. Professor Emerson cautions that "[s]erious administrative diffi-
culties arise, of course, in attempting to frame restrictions which affect
only children, and do not impinge upon the rights of others."3 22 Nev-
ertheless, billboard restrictions near schools, and perhaps, advertising
limitations for magazines without any adult readers, would directly
further the state interest in protecting minors.323
Besides narrow restrictions for advertisements aimed only at chil-
dren, there are other government measures that could help decrease
tobacco consumption by minors without infringing First Amendment
rights. First, the government should pursue stricter enforcement
against illegal sale of cigarettes to minors, by establishing a minimum
age to purchase tobacco products, 24 imposing greater fines against
sellers who violate the minimum-age rule,325 and removing vending
machines which allow easy access to cigarettes.326 Second, the govern-
ment should promote educational speech instead of suppressing to-
bacco advertisements. 327 Third, higher tobacco taxes can provide
another source of funding for educational campaigns, and they can
financially deter smokers from purchasing tobacco products. Fourth,
the government can gradually reduce the level of addictive nicotine in
321 See supra text accompanying notes 155-65.
322 Emerson, supra note 215, at 939.
323 Professor Redish agrees with this analysis, stating:
This analysis dictates the conclusion that restrictions on tobacco advertising
within a certain distance of a school or playground are constitutional. How-
ever, more general restrictions on tobacco advertising cannot constitution-
ally be regulated on the grounds that minors will also be exposed to it. To
allow such restrictions would be to reduce all of society to a community of
children for purposes of the First Amendment.
Redish, supra note 159, at 608.
324 FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399.
325 Ludwikowski, supra note 137, at 116 ("A stricter enforcement of the prohibition law
could make any potentially enticing tobacco advertising irrelevant, if such enforcement
accomplishes a decline in teen smoking.").
326 FDA Rule, supra note 2, at 44,399.
327 Evidence suggested that cigarette consumption declined when there was a concen-
trated effort to provide antismoking advertisements under the fairness doctrine. See Capi-
tal Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587-88 (D.D.C 1971) (Wright, J.,
dissenting) ("[T] he broadcast media were flooded with exceedingly effective anti-smoking
commercials. For the first time in years, the statistics began to show a sustained trend
toward lesser cigarette consumption."), afl'd sub nr. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Klein-
dienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Proposed FDA Rule, supra note 4, at 41,327 ("During this
time, per capita cigarette consumption declined seven percent, from 4,280 in 1967 to 3,985
in 1970. Most of the seven percent decline (6.2%) was attributable to the anti-smoking
messages.").
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tobacco products.3 28 Finally, the government should continue to im-
pose more restrictions on smoking, such as the prohibition of smok-
ing on domestic airline flights, to show an active disapproval of
tobacco consumption.3 29 These alternatives address the government's
concerns, but maintain the free flow of information for adult
consumers.3 90
The current debate on tobacco regulations serves as a useful tool
to evaluate the current commercial speech doctrine. The government
and courts could properly deal with this legitimate public concern
and simultaneously return consistency to commercial speech. Courts
should not struggle when applying the Central Hudson test to restric-
tions on advertising of harmful products. Instead, regulations should
narrowly address tobacco consumption by minors and vigorously pur-
sue other alternatives without transgressing First Amendment rights.
This solution would honor an antipaternalistic attitude toward com-
mercial speech for adult consumers, return the responsibility for in-
formed decisionmaking to the adult consumer under a properly
defined Central Hudson test, and uphold narrowly tailored regulations
for children.
CONCLUSION
First Amendment scholars and advertisers cannot predict with
certainty how regulations aimed at tobacco advertisements, or other
harmful products, would fare under the Central Hudson analysis.
There are strong legal arguments suggesting that the broad restric-
tions inhibiting dissemination of this information to consumers fall
under intermediate scrutiny. There are courts, however, which refuse
to hold these regulations to heightened scrutiny and, instead, defer to
328 See Helberg, supra note 8, at 1267 (citing H.R. 1853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1995)). In the context of alcohol, Justice Stevens argued:
If Congress is concerned about the potential for increases in the alcohol
content of malt beverages, it may, of course, take other steps to combat the
problem without running afoul of the First Amendment-for example,
Congress may limit directly the alcoholic content of malt beverages. But
Congress may not seek to accomplish the same purpose through a policy of
consumer ignorance, at the expense of the free-speech rights of the sellers
and purchasers.
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1597 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). The
same logic should apply to regulations of tobacco advertisements.
329 See Law, supra note 8, at 917. Law states, "Federal law bans smoking on virtually all
domestic flights. Over 38 states have banned smoking in a range of public spaces. Locali-
ties often adopt restrictions on smoking that go beyond state laws, and private employers
enforce no-smoking rules that are more rigorous than those required by state law." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
330 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (stating that people will determine their best interests when they are in-
formed and when the channels of communication remain open).
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legislative findings. The inconsistent Central Hudson doctrine should
concern consumers, since advertisements lead to informed, intelligent
economic decisions about products-whether the products are harm-
ful or not. Commercial speech has strayed from the Virginia Pharmacy
rationale which protected the rights of the consumer instead of ac-
cepting the government's paternalistic interests.
This Note's proposal would bring the rights of the consumer to
the forefront of commercial speech jurisprudence. As a result, all
truthful advertisements of legal products to adult consumers would
receive the requisite protection accorded them under the commercial
speech doctrine. Thus, the regulation would fail unless the govern-
ment met its rigorous burden of proving that it had a substantial inter-
est; that there existed a direct and material link between the
regulation and the interest; and that the regulation was not more ex-
tensive than necessary to satisfy that interest. The government could
limit to a greater extent the rights of minor consumers, who cannot
always make mature, intelligent decisions. Narrow regulations to ad-
dress physical health dangers to children merit greater latitude.
Therefore, because the current FDA rule fails the intermediate scru-
tiny test accorded commercial speech, the government should con-
sider narrower restrictions for advertisements aimed at protecting
children. In addition, the government should undertake other alter-
natives that urge more antismoking speech and stricter enforcement
of current laws prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors. Although
not all advertisements can receive absolute First Amendment protec-
tion, this solution will prove more effective than having courts, legisla-
tures, consumers, and advertisers struggle through a nebulous
balancing of rules of interpretation. Such a struggle could lead only
to damaging effects for the overall protection of truthful, nonmislead-
ing advertisements for the astute consumer.
Howard K Jeruchimowitz
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